

INTELLIGENCE

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Major General W. J. Donovan

FROM : Major G. E. Borst

SUBJECT: Attached Document

DATE: 12 March 1945

Attached is the translation of document, PR-009, received by the Low Countries Desk SI from Belgian Intelligence. It is an extract from "Die Deutsche Polizei" No. 11 of June 1, 1940.

It is the German version of the tie-up between the British and Dutch Intelligence Services and espionage carried on against Germany.

Believing that this document is of particular interest to you, we are sending you a copy for your information and retention.

G. E. Borst
Major G. E. Borst

Major G. E. Borst

*I will submit
to see the
from him
to him.*

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Extract from "Die Deutsche Polizei" No 11
June 1, 1940

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Jul. 14. 1940
x 13. 1. 1940
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HOW THE BRITISH SECRET SERVICE OPERATED
WITH DUTCH AND BELGIAN ASSISTANCE

REPORT BY THE MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REICH

Berlin, 29.3.40

1.

Already during the World war, the British Intelligence Service worked in close cooperation not only with their allies the Belgians, but also with the strong support of the highest circles in the then neutral Netherlands. Even then, Britain and the British Intelligence Service, with the knowledge of neutral Holland, carried on their war of disaffection, corruption, sabotage and blockade under the following directions:

1. TUCKLEY (P.R. Reserve Officer). Intelligence officer working against the territories of continental Germany.
2. Admiral GORDON CAMPBELL, working against the German navy.
3. Major J. J. J. and
4. Captain J. J. J., member of the British Territorial
5. working against the German front.

The office operated under the cover of "The Uranium Steamship Company". Among his collaborators were the South African Jew, Captain J. J. J., later the successor of TUCKLEY and J. J. J. officer in The Netherlands; an Englishman whose alias was J. J. J., and others.

SECRET

PA 880

- 2 -

Economic operations against Germany (Black Lists, etc.) were chiefly directed by the British Consul General in Rotterdam, whose chief collaborator was the Jewish Commercial Attache, OPPENHEIMER. An Englishman, Captain DELORET, was at that time chief liaison officer between the British and Dutch authorities. He received German intelligence and any necessary help in police matters from the Dutch Commissioner of Rotterdam, VAN DER POL.

But even at that time the strongest supporter of the British was the "homme de confiance" of the Queen of Holland, the Police Commissioner of Rotterdam, VAN T'ENANT, who accepted not only British money for himself, but also put the Prince Consort, whose confidant he was, in touch with the British. These advance payments from British Intelligence funds financed the Prince Consort's extravagant way of life, and were partly responsible for the smooth working of this service in "neutral" Holland.

- 3 -

It is well known that collaboration between British intelligence, neutral Holland and now neutral Belgium has not been abandoned. Rather has it been enlarged, with the knowledge and approbation of official circles working efficiently under British orders.

The officers, "hommes de confiance" and agents of the Secret Intelligence Service, fulfil various internal policy functions within the British Empire. Outside the Empire they undertake intelligence, economic propaganda, and political and military sabotage missions. For a long time the service was directed by Admiral SINGULAR (C.B.S.), who died on 4 November 1939. Colonel ROBERT M. M. M. M., his permanent representative, succeeded him.

SECRET

PX 149

- 3 -

The so-called Passport Control Office (P.C.O.) constitutes the organizational framework of the service, and is always headed by experienced intelligence officers, under cover of accredited diplomatic officials.

Major STEVENS was Passport Control Officer to the British Embassy in The Hague - First Secretary of Embassy, and officially accredited as a diplomat, as were DUNDERDALE in Paris, and PEARSON in Switzerland.

An important adjunct to the "official" P.C.O. is a special organization within S.I.S., sometimes called the Z Organization. It is directly controlled from London and the most important man in it is Colonel DANSEZ, now in Switzerland. This organization specializes in extremely important political missions, and also exercises a measure of internal surveillance within the service.

In peacetime, the Z Organization has no connection with the Passport Control Offices; in wartime it can, when necessary, be joined to the P.C.O. either for improved courier communications or to avoid duplication of agents' work. This was done in Holland. Mr. BEST, now under arrest in Germany, was an important representative of the Z Organization and maintained headquarters in The Hague. As a Captain on the General Staff in the last war, he worked for British Intelligence in Holland.

Working under a commercial cover, BEST founded a Holding Society known as: "Stock Company N.V. Handelsdienst voor het Continent, Continental Trade Service". In his intelligence activities he used to great advantage his long experience in Holland. BEST's partners were two Dutchmen: HAUF and VAN DER WILK. The latter, his particular accomplice, worked on political intelligence and active espionage in favor of Germany. The offices of this Society were at 15 Nieuwe Uitlege, The Hague.

BEST's working methods were typical of the British Secret Service; they consisted of procuring, through his economic and social relations, the highest type of intelligence. His relations with Dutch contacts were of the highest

SECRET

- 4 -

both official and non-official, were excellent, and were strengthened by the social liaisons which his Dutch wife (the daughter of the well-known Dutch General VAN KESSE) obtained for him. She painted the portrait of the late Prince Consort, and, at the request of the King of England, that of the Princess of Holland.

Before the war, Captain BEST was directly in touch with London and with the head of the Z Organization in Brussels, DANSEY. DANSEY would spend three days a week in London, and three in Brussels. Shortly before the outbreak of war, London ordered that BEST's and STEVEN's organizations be joined together for technical reasons. This enabled BEST to use the P.C.O. couriers, telegraph codes, etc.

The following are in Major STEVENS' service:

1. Captain LENDRICKS, British, was STEVENS' representative. An ex-Belgian subject who served in the Belgian Army during the world war, he maintains liaison with the Belgian Intelligence Service and the P.C. officer, Colonel LATHOPE.
2. Captain RADNEY DENNY, official director of Passport Control, and chief of surveillance.
3. Captain Lionel LOEWE, a Jew working on military affairs, and principal liaison with the Dutch General Staff.
4. J. J. J., anonymous Dutch police official with excellent relations; in effect the principal agent and recruiter of agents; in the service of the British since the World War. Liaison agent with all Dutch police authorities.
5. JESSE, British Pilot officer, (Air Intelligence).
6. J. J. J., Dutch, agent and passport controller.

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- 5 -
- 7. RHODES { All British, employed only by the intelligence
 - 8. STRETMAN { service under cover of Passport Control.
 - 9. BREWER {
 - 10. INMAN { Radio technicians.
 - 11. WALSH {

The office is at 57, Nieuwe Parklaan, The Hague

Collaboration between Colonel LATHROPE, head of the British P.C.O. in Brussels, and STEVENS, was naturally very close and very fruitful. Besides his relations with and through LATHROPE, STEVENS was also directly in touch with the Belgian Intelligence Service at The Hague through the Assistant Military Attache, Major DIEPENHUYCK.

Colonel LATHROPE is in very close touch with the head of the Belgian Intelligence Service, Colonel MERCKX. Another proof of the common activities of the Belgian and French Intelligence Services on the one hand, and the British and Belgian on the other, is that the ex-British Intelligence Officer, Captain LESLIE "MELVILLE" and the ex-French Intelligence Officer, Captain NEIX" are liaison officers for their own services with the Belgian Intelligence service.

- 3 -

In Holland, the British Intelligence Service usually employs Dutch subjects for missions in and against Germany, unless it can employ German traitors. In Belgium, S.I.S. also usually employs Belgian subjects.

The British system only works efficiently because it has the support and approval of the highest military and political circles.

Military and political intelligence on Germany was naturally

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exchange between STEVENS and Major TRUTAT, his French colleague in Holland, (before taking up his post in The Hague. STEVENS had worked in the same bureau in Paris with Colonel REYER and Colonel GLENN). STEVENS and TRUTAT had also, with the consent of the Dutch Army and Navy High Command, had a similar exchange of views with the head of the Dutch General Staff Intelligence Service, Major General van OORSCHOT, then retired. This was facilitated by the fact that van OORSCHOT's wife was English, that he himself was President of the Netherlands-British Association in The Hague, and that he spent his yearly vacations in England with Admiral SINCLAIR (J.B.S.) and Captain HANFORD.

General van OORSCHOT introduced to STEVENS the Jew von BLANKENSTEIN, a fanatical Germanophile, because he knew that STEVENS wanted contacts which would procure for him intelligence for use against Germany. General van OORSCHOT even explained to him in detail that von BLANKENSTEIN would be a completely reliable intelligence agent, from a British point of view. General van OORSCHOT constantly intervened also as an important witness in British intelligence activities, directed exclusively against Germany. This picture is completed by the fact that General van OORSCHOT, head of the Dutch General Intelligence Service, as a member of the Dutch General Staff, and that he worked as a British P.O.C. agent in The Hague, his P.O.C. number being 920.

The same close relationship exists in the exchange of intelligence between the French and Belgian services, and between the British and the head of the Belgian General Staff, Major General MICHEM or Lieutenant General VAN DEN BERGHE, E.H., the latter being liaison officer with the Dutch General Staff. Captain Lionel LONGUE worked as a specialist on military questions, in very close collaboration with his colleague Captain

FR 889

- 7 -

OLIVIER, a Dutch specialist on the German Army attached to the Dutch General Staff.

Major ROSEBOOM, head of the Dutch Military Intelligence (Defense), is in touch with STEVENS' closest collaborator and present representative: HENDRICKX; they work together very closely.

Major TRUTAT is liaison between the French Intelligence Service and the Dutch General Staff, and works very closely with his colleague and friend, Major van DER PLAMBOIE of the Dutch General Staff.

According to the statements of the two intelligence officers now under arrest in Germany, Britain and France received secret documents through these channels, reporting serious trouble within the German Army. BEST describes their collaboration in writing as follows: "STEVENS worked in Holland as though he had been an officer of the Dutch General Staff".

Collaboration with Captain DUNDEDALE, British intelligence officer in Paris, was naturally very close. Captain DUNDEDALE, Major STEVENS and Captain BEST together built up a network of agents covering all of Germany.

A retired officer of the Dutch Navy residing in France, Paul KOSTER, played a particularly important part in the collaboration of these three. He is a millionaire - a munitions manufacturer by profession - and has very high contacts in the Dutch Army. He is such an intimate friend of the Dutch Vice-Admiral J.Th. FURSTNER - and of LARSTENS - that he presented FURSTNER with a detailed plan for a British coastal intelligence service/against Germany, including an agents' network, radio posts and courier channels. Admiral FURSTNER covered up KOSTER's activities.

KOSTER placed himself at the disposal of the British Intelligence Service, not only to furnish it with intelligence on the German Army, Navy and Airforce,

SECRET

FR 880

- 8 -

but also for the implementation of acts of sabotage of all kinds. For the latter he offered a thousand agents.

The following facts prove that not only did the High Command of the Dutch Army and Navy knowingly work with England against Germany, but that other important Services also collaborated with England.

In 1938, Dr. COMBING, Dutch Minister of Justice, liberated one PORTER at the request of the Dutch General Staff, and at STEWENS' wish. PORTER was an emigrant and a ships' saboteur, working for England, who had been arrested in Denmark for spying for the British. He maintained a vast network of saboteurs on behalf of the British Intelligence Service, notably in the Scandinavian countries; this had necessitated, before his arrest, a constantly increased defense.

In order to eliminate any difficulties arising from the fact that minor Dutch officials, ignoring the agreement between high official circles, might impede the work of S.I.S. agents and intelligence officers, General van OORSCHOT arranged with the British and French intelligence officers that in case of arrest, agents of the British service should pass themselves off as agents of the Dutch Intelligence Service and report to General van OORSCHOT. This agreement went into effect when the Dutchman JACK BIRD, Captain BERT's secretary, was arrested by minor Dutch officials.

When Major STEWENS' collaborator RHODES (an Estonian, and the son of a General) was so publicly censured for losing a secret report that the Dutch police had to have him expelled, the affair was dismissed as insignificant, and this through the intervention of General van OORSCHOT and Major HOUSEMAN, although the British Ambassador had already made an official démarche.

These methods were equally successful at the time of the dealings of the British intelligence officers with the so-called German opposition,

FM 880

- 9 -

and the temporary arrest of these delegates.

The same methods are used by the British service in Belgium, as is proved by the following: LATHROPE requested the transfer from Holland to Belgium of POMTSON, the ships' saboteur mentioned above. LATHROPE was able to negotiate all difficulties connected with frontier passage and visitor's permits, thanks to his collaboration with the Belgian Intelligence Service and military authorities, just as STEVENS and BEST had done in Holland.

- 4 -

In accordance with the traditions and experience of British policy and of the secret service, the Head Office in London (in this case Lord HALIFAX) has tried for a long time and by all methods to get in touch with German opposition groups, with the aim of overthrowing the National-Socialist Government. British Government circles, whose information is derived chiefly from refugees, imagine that there is a fairly strong opposition in Germany. Therefore in 1939, Captain BEST was ordered by the Head Office in London to get in touch with intermediaries who had been working up to that time with the British Z Organization, using as a cut-out the German emigré Karl SPIECKER, formerly a moderate politician and a ministerial official.

BEST was given the following mission: to strengthen relations with the German opposition, and if possible to confer with a highly placed representative of all the members of the German opposition. The object of these conferences would be:

Total overthrow of the political set-up in Germany, elimination of the Führer and his closest collaborators, and conclusion of peace in accordance with British war aims, that is to say, restoration of the status quo particularly as regards Czechoslovakia, Austria, Dantzig, Poland, etc...

PR 889

- 10 -

The basic idea was that England, reversing her former political ideas, wished the war to end in her favor, through internal disturbances in Germany, since she feared she might be unable to win through force of arms.

The SS Secret Service and the State Secret Police obtained knowledge of these plans from their intelligence services. They advised the Reich Government of the plot, and were told that the plan for political subversion of Germany should be allowed to continue until, and including, the arrest of the British intelligence officers, which arrest would be documentary proof of the plot.

STEELE, recognizing the enormous political import of these negotiations, tried to get the Head Office in London (SINGLAI or HALIFAX) to confine these conferences to the Ambassador in The Hague, Sir BLEND. London, with the concurrence of the British Ambassador, rejected this request for transfer of responsibility, and ordered the intelligence service to follow up this affair, while keeping the Head Office informed of the course of events by telephone and telegram. According to the statements of the British intelligence officers, the official exclusion from this plan of the British Ambassador was only a precautionary and face-saving measure, since he was accredited to neutral Holland.

In order to avoid any friction in these important negotiations, (known as "peace negotiations" in the minutes of the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs) STEELE called on General van CORCKHOUT and informed him of the project. Van CORCKHOUT in his turn informed the Chief of the General Staff of the High Command of the Dutch Army and Navy, CARSTENS, and the Chief of these forces, of the intentions of the British Secret Service. In accordance with the instructions of these Chiefs, he participated in

SECRET

PR 860

- 11 -

negotiations by delegating an officer named KLOP, of the Dutch General Staff, to whom he gave the following precise instructions:

1. Eliminate any control difficulties connected with the negotiations.
2. Guarantee the personal protection of the British intelligence officers.
3. Keep his chiefs constantly informed on the situation.

In order to conceal from the German intermediaries the fact that neutral Holland was a partner of the British in these negotiations, KLOP was ordered by General van COESTER to pass himself off as a British officer under the name of Captain COPPER.

His activities resulted in five meetings which took place between KLOP, COPPER, and COPPER (KLOP) on one side, and the German intermediaries on the other, on

21 October at Zutphen and Arnhem,
22 October at The Hague,
2 November at Backhuysen Veen,
3 November at Backhuysen Veen,
4 November at Backhuysen Veen.

KLOP / COPPER was present at all these meetings, took an active part in the discussions, and situated all military and police controls by his own intervention. He was responsible for freeing the alleged intermediaries of the German opposition when they were arrested on Dutch soil, obtaining their identity check. He also gave the interested parties a list signed by him, asking all Dutch authorities to enable the holders to telephone The Hague, at the secret number 656.331, (a telephone number of the British secret service). At the time of the last two meetings, KLOP / COPPER advised German opposition, and provided a fairly large detail of secret information. For the last meeting he even produced military maps for their safety. It was also he who, at the last

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meeting, was the first to open fire.

The Dutch General Staff took part in the conspiracy against the

Reich.

The instructions radioed to BRENN by the British Government, and communicated by him to the German delegates, were to have formed the basis of the negotiations. The British proposals were as follows: Elimination of the Führer, elimination of the present German régime, and of all its leaders, and their replacement by a Government acceptable to Great Britain. At these meetings, the wish was also expressed that Germany should abandon her present economic policy, and return to the gold standard. The British aim seems to have been not only a return to the Versailles system, but the dissolution of the Reich, and the creation of a system of Federal States. Germany was to be rendered powerless for ever. The German delegates refused to agree to these proposals, while awaiting the approval of the rest of the opposition; upon this, the British asked them to call in a high representative, and put him in touch with the British agents in Holland.

The British agents reported these conversations to the British Government in London, through Mr. STREVEN, by means of a telephone conversation made in the presence of one of the supposed members of the German opposition. Admiral HINGHAM, Chief of the British Intelligence Service, later telephoned the approval of Lord HALIFAX, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, on the course of the negotiations.

It was at this point, as has already been mentioned, that STREVEN established a transmitting set and a receiving set; they had a secret code and the Belgian call number O.H.4, the number under which the British post worked in The Hague. This was done to insure unhindered communications.

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- 13 -

Acting under instructions, the Reichsführer SS Secret Service and the Secret State police succeeded in drawing the British into a restaurant known to be frequented by smugglers, and located 10 meters from the official frontier; this was done under pretext of frontier difficulties, and the danger of being observed. Still acting under instructions, our secret police arrested, after an exchange of fire, the two officers of the British Intelligence Service, the Dutch General Staff officer who was seriously wounded, and the Dutch chauffeur of the British Intelligence officer, LEHMENS.

Still believing he was in touch with a "German opposition group", Captain HENDRICKX, the representative in The Hague, telephoned at 18:30 on 16 November 1939, seven days after the arrest of DEER and STEVENS, to the so-called opposition group that "the radio message from the German opposition group had been received the day before, that negotiations would be continued under the conditions already agreed upon, and that. M. MALBIEUX, President of the French Ministry, must be first consulted; finally that in view of the recent events, special precautions must be taken at the next meeting."

By living witnesses and by documents we have complete proof and confirmation of the intrigues of the British and Dutch, with Belgian participation, all aimed at the overthrow of the German régime.

- 14 -

These admissions made by Lieutenant Colonel KLOP, while seriously wounded, were the result of an interrogation at Düsseldorf on the evening of 9 November 1939, and are both alarming and enlightening. Because of their importance, these confessions and admissions have been repeated word for word.

SECRET

FR 889

- 14 -

KLOP's serious admission concerning the close collaboration between Britain at war and neutral Holland and Belgium, with the object of harming Germany, was presented to Major STURMIS and Captain DEET in the course of a conflicting interrogation, in order to obtain further details of this dangerous collaboration between Great Britain, France, and neutral Holland and Belgium.

These important facts given by the British Intelligence officers, concerning the work of British agents and their criminal intrigues, will form the basis for proceedings which will shortly be publicly instituted by our tribunals. These proceedings will shed new light on the plans of the obscure, homosexual, and even asocial elements of the "Secret Intelligence Service".

Reich Minister of the Interior

/s/ FRICK

Reichsführer SS and Chief of German Police

/s/ HIMMLER

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ANTHONY MORGAN

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10 ATTACHMENT B

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Substantive 26. 12. 8
TS 49
Rec'd memo
 RADIO: Memo fr Major Lee and Eschig Services dtd 30 August 1945, Subj: DOTS 169
 Preparation for peacetime intelligence, China Theater area.
Lee, Eschig memo copy

1st Ind.

Hq Office of Strategic Services, China Theater, Intelligence Division,
 APO 627, 3 September 1945

To: Strategic Services Office ex, China Theater, APO 627

1. Basic memorandum is forwarded for your approval.

2. It is the intention of this division to prepare as rapidly as possible a master intelligence plan covering peacetime operations in China, Manchuria, Korea and French Indo-China. The plan itself will be a specific operational program. Attached to it will be appendices covering suitable personnel, degree of implementation as of the date of the plan, communications and proposals for effecting the transition from OSS as presently constituted to the new organization. It is proposed that this plan be completed within such time that it may be taken back to Washington by the undersigned or such other officer as you may designate not later than thirty to forty-five days before the final liquidation of OSS/OT. This will permit personal discussions in Washington and instituting of such measures for transition as may be necessary.

3. It is suggested that basic memorandum be forwarded to the Director in Washington with copy to Lt. Comdr. McBaine, FBI.

Paul L. E. McMillan
 PAUL L. E. McMILLAN
 Lt. Colonel, F. A.
 Intelligence Officer, OSS/OT

2nd Ind.

Hq Office of Strategic Services, China Theater, APO 627, 4 September 1945.

To: Director, Office of Strategic Services, Washington, D. C.

1. Approved.

2. Forwarded.

Richard P. Hoppner
 RICHARD P. HOPPNER
 Colonel, F. A.
 Strategic Services Officer, OSS/OT

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REGISTRY NO.

**HEADQUARTERS
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
CHINA THEATER
APO 687**

Intelligence Division
30 August 1945

ALICE

Subject: Preparation for Peacetime Intelligence - China Theater Area
To : Lt. Col. Paul L. E. Helliwell, Intelligence Officer, OSS/IT
From : Major Duncan G. Lee and Malign Bourd Serfass

(The following is a statement of the assumption, approach, objectives and implementing steps concerning the preparation for peacetime intelligence activities in the China Theater area. It is proposed as a basic guide for briefing all personnel concerned in this activity to insure uniform policy and action.)

1. Short Term Task. During the next four or five months the immediate intelligence mission of OSS will be to service the Commanding General, China Theater, and subordinate Theater commands and agencies with the information they will require during the period before their withdrawal from the theater. Intelligence directives for these months have already been sent to the field, and additional requests will be dispatched from time to time as they are received from customer agencies.

2. Long Range Task. When the U. S. Theater establishment leaves China, OSS as a component military organization will go with it. Before we go, however, it is General Donovan's desire that everything possible be done to prepare and lay the foundations for a permanent American peacetime intelligence service in what is probably the most strategically important area of the world from the point of view of U. S.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Intelligence Officer

30 August 1945

interests and security. If possible we hope to leave behind a nuclear organization which can either continue operations without interruption or can at least be activated at a later time when required. Except for this possible stay-behind group, there can be no connection or organizational continuity between the present OSS and the future intelligence service. All preparatory planning and action during this period of transition must be based upon the following postulates:

a. It is not certain that any U. S. peacetime intelligence organization will function in this area. If there is one, it is highly uncertain what agency will run it, what funds will be available, etc. All planning and arrangements must be designed to fit into any possible organizational setup and control. The only assumptions made in this paper are, (1) that the work will be done and (2) that minimum necessary funds therefor will be available.

b. It is certain that for peacetime work control and direction of activities must be exercised from Washington. The recruiting and training of key personnel, their briefing and the setting up of their communications must for the most part be done there. This is made necessary by security considerations as well as by the fact that all intelligence customers will now be in Washington rather than in the field.

c. Anything done in this period will be done under conditions of extreme political delicacy. The period of wartime unity is over, and our Allies, who formerly welcomed or at least tolerated our activities when directed against the common enemy, will now inevitably and rightly regard themselves as the targets for U. S. intelligence work. They will take

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

30 August 1945

Intelligence Officer

increasingly stringent counter measures to oppose us. The consequence of exposure might well be a major diplomatic incident, which would not only do incalculable harm to the successful prosecution of this work but might also have extremely serious consequences for our international relations. One consequence of this is that we may assume that accredited U. S. diplomatic representatives will usually be at the best timorous and at the worst actively hostile and obstructive. It follows that extreme caution must be preserved in everything that is done at this time; that where a calculated risk is to be assumed, the decision to do so must come from the very few officers at Headquarters OSS/OT who know the complete picture; and that the strictest discipline must be preserved by all personnel concerned.

d. For the reasons discussed above, it is obvious that the highest possible security must be maintained with respect to every phase of this work. It must be remembered at all times that every action taken to implement this program is taken UNDER COVER. At the moment our cover is for the most part a military cover, but the work is no less undercover for that. As few people as possible should know that we are planning or even thinking in terms of peacetime activities. This means that as few people as possible even in OSS should be approached regarding the possibility of future work, and those who are approached must be told as little as possible and cautioned to maintain the highest security.

3. Objectives. Our objectives during this time of preparation will be the following.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

30 August 1945

Intelligence Officer

4

- a. Survey of potentially useful personnel and contacts.
- b. Recruiting and placing certain key personnel.
- c. Survey of operating methods and procedures.
- d. Assembling operational intelligence.

4. Survey of personnel and contacts.

a. Potentially useful personnel may be U. S. citizens, non-U. S. Europeans or natives of the particular area. They may be used as key members of the organization working full time, as conscious part-time participants or as unwitting informants. They may work voluntarily or they may be paid. We want to know about all such potentially useful personnel who might be used in any one of the ways indicated above. First priority, obviously, are those who can be used on the basis of full conscious participation since these will be the key members of the field service.

b. All field teams must immediately commence a survey of potentially useful personnel. The dossier on any individual should include the following information:

- (1) Basic data such as name, age, address, citizenship, etc.
- (2) Type of intelligence work for which he would be suitable.
- (3) Why it is believed that he would be suitable for such work, i.e. education, languages, job, associations, interests, etc.
- (4) What covers has he or could he use.
- (5) Are his motivation, loyalty and security such as to permit his use for the work proposed.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Intelligence Officer

5

30 August 1945

- (6) How he should be approached, contacted and recruited at the proper time, including any necessary special arrangements.

NB Where an individual is naturally associated with other potentially useful personnel as, e.g. in a marketing organization, etc., the organization should be reported as such with the individuals grouped together. Attached is a suggested report form for individual dossiers.

c. For the reasons stated above in paragraph 2 no one may approach any individual directly or indirectly with a view to recruiting him for post war work without direct authorization from this headquarters.

The following, however, may and should be done.

- (1) Make as many contacts as possible with potentially useful personnel
- (2) Within the discretion of the group leader, enlist the assistance of suitable individuals in connection with the short range intelligence tasks of the next few months. This will still be work for the Theater Commander on which we presumably will continue to have the cooperation of our Allies. However, great caution must still be used, and it should be borne in mind always that a man who works for OSS for a few months now may well be blown so completely that he cannot be used later. Cutouts and other security devices should be used to protect any such individual who was potential future value.

d. Where the contact approaches an OSS officer and applies for peacetime work, the latter should say simply that he knows nothing of future plans but that he will report the offer in case anything should develop.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Intelligence Officer

6

30 August 1945

a. Present OSS personnel and other U. S. military personnel in the theater should be carefully surveyed by this headquarters and by the commanding officer of each field team for its particular area. Except in cases where no other procedure is possible, the field group leader should not approach any such personnel but should simply make sure that they check in at the office of INDIV upon their return to this headquarters.

5. Recruiting and placing certain key personnel.

a. As stated above, no recruiting may take place except as specifically authorized and directed from this headquarters.

b. Since our post-withdrawal recruiting will largely depend upon reports received as a result of the personnel survey, it becomes most important that the survey be commenced as soon as possible and that the results be reported to this headquarters without delay.

6. Survey of operating methods.

a. OSS is now operating in a period of transition in which conditions will become increasingly like those of peacetime (see paragraph 2 c and d above) i.e., conditions in which only under cover operations are possible.

b. During this period the short-range job of intelligence collection in response to immediate Theater directives should be used as the occasion for experimenting in and testing operating methods which can be used in peacetime.

c. It is recognized that during this period we will continue to do most of our intelligence collection through the comparatively open methods employed until now. Obviously our U. S. personnel cannot themselves

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

30 August 1945

Intelligence Officer

go suddenly under cover. They should, however, attempt to preserve and extend the undercover contacts they have already developed and to make new ones, remembering always that now as never before the highest security and caution is necessary.

d. Except in a few exceptional cases (e.g. Phoenix) existing undercover chains or contacts, or those which may be developed during the next few months, cannot, for security reasons, be used by any peacetime organization which may succeed the military OSS. Field personnel must be instructed that what they now build undercover will in almost every case be used to produce (1) immediate intelligence and (2) experience and doctrine. They are not to consider that they are establishing agent chains which will survive our withdrawal. Of course, particular individuals or groups who may have future value should be reported to this headquarters.

e. Each field team should report fully on operating methods and procedures applied in their particular areas.

7. Collection of operational intelligence.

a. By operational intelligence is meant all intelligence on conditions in a given area which should be known for the conduct of successful operations there. Names of and data on potentially useful personnel and contacts and the results of experiments with operating methods and procedures, both already covered, are examples. Other examples are:

- (1) Local security conditions and controls, OE organization and measures, etc.
- (2) Relevant information on local political situation, e.g. officials who may be useful to us because of their political position.
- (3) Pro- or anti-foreign sentiment among different

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Intelligence Officer

30 August 1945

groups of the local population.

(4) Communications facilities.

(5) Strategic positions, geographically and in terms of contacts, where men should be placed and set up.

b. All field personnel should be on the alert at all times to collect this category of information and to report it promptly and fully to this headquarters.

8. Reports and follow-up.

a. The long-range preparation work outlined above is undoubtedly our most important task during the coming months. It will also be more difficult to accomplish than the collection and reporting of day to day intelligence and consequently there will be a tendency to defer it.

b. In order to insure that this work is receiving priority attention, the following procedure is proposed:

- (1) This program must, for security reasons, be presented orally to area base and field team commanding officers. Major Lee and Ensign Berfass will visit all field installations during the next few weeks for this purpose. To insure adequate understanding of present operations and continuity in the future conduct of these operations each of them will be accompanied by a member of the Operations Section concerned with the particular area.
- (2) A weekly report on progress made on all phases of this program will be submitted by each field team.
- (3) Where necessary, follow-up "needle" trips by headquarters officers will be made, and field team personnel will be pulled back to headquarters for further consultation and briefing.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Intelligence Officer

10 August 1945

- (4) The timing of information must be set to meet the deadlines required by the production of the master intelligence plan for the China Theater areas.

DUNCAN C. IRE
Major, AUS

BEURT SERVANS
Ensign, USNR

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POUCH SLIP

OSS/ CHINA THEATER
APO 627 C/O U.S. ARMY

TO BE FILLED IN BY REGISTRY

POUCH # 4/PA ITEM # 2DATE POUCHED 5 Sept 43

TO BE FILLED IN BY ORIGINATING OFFICE:

DATE OF FROM (BRANCH & NAME)

SUBJECT DESCRIPTION

BRANCH

CORRESP. TO (NAME, BRANCH, ORGANIZATION, ADDRESS)

FILE #

9/4

230

Directory, OSS
Wash DC

~~1 copy to be retained in file~~

Angus

TOP SECRET

730-49

CLASSIFICATION

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: 5 September 1948

TO : General Magruder

FROM : Chief SI

SUBJECT: Lt. Col. Helliwell's memo to Director on China Theater Post-War Intelligence Activity.

Returned herewith is Top Secret DOTS 851 (TK-000-800), together with a memorandum from Lt. Conrad McBain dated 31 August, with which I agree.

These comments are prepared pursuant to your request 31 August.

W. H. S.

To General Magruder:

The Helliwell memo is checked.
See Lt. Conrad's memo attached.

Sgt.

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REPORTING OFFICER: [REDACTED]

Attachment No.

DATE: 10-1-68

[illegible]

should be numbered to correspond with number in To column.
on a loose sheet under each comment.
should be used in To column.
initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing.
should be indicated in Comments column.
should always be returned to Registry.
non adequate sheet.

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161 320 6
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
 WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

MEMORANDUM

31 August 1945

To : Chief, SI

From : Far East Div., SI

Subject: Lt. Col. Halliwell's Memo on Post-War Intelligence Activity

I return herewith Lt. Col. Halliwell's memo to the Director on post-war intelligence activity, China Theater. It seems likely from the date of the memo that it was prepared for delivery to the Director personally during the latter's recent trip to China.

The memorandum seems to fuse, if not confuse, two separate stages: first, the post-hostilities or military occupation period, and second, the ultimate post-war or non-military, civilian period.

Plans for the first period would seem rightly the concern of SI China which must clear them through appropriate channels with General Wedemeyer. Washington can give advice and help but the final clearance must come from General Wedemeyer.

Plans for the second period must either originate or clear in Washington. General Donovan's comment, "This selection (i.e., of the commercial U.S. companies to be approached) must be made at Director's Office", clearly indicates this. His cable #24427 to Kuning, announcing his decision to liquidate and saying, "Within sensible bounds I wish us to take on any new project and personnel which if not done would be of disadvantage to U.S. interest. In other words we must assume the continuity of Government and the necessity of keeping a live area for our successor and when such a situation as the above arises it should be presented at once to Washington for decision.", indicates the same thing. In other words, while SI China should do preliminary planning in this phase, final clearance must come from Washington.

In view of the decision to liquidate OSS and the language of the Director quoted above, it seems to me that Lt. Col. Halliwell's memo is obsolete. Attached hereto is a cable indicating that Lt. Col. Halliwell is forwarding an up-to-date plan. I suggest that comments be deferred until the latter is received.

You may want to act with regard to Major Lee before this, however, and incorporate comments on Lt. Col. Halliwell's first memo in so doing.

Turner McSweeney
 Turner McSweeney
 Lt. Col., USNR
 Div. Dep., Far East, SI

* Not attached (NHS)
 in forwarding to General Hagerman
 Att. Reference he is in 22969
 (# 23404 from Kuning)

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Subject: Country Information for Foreign Intelligence Activities
 To: Strategic Services Officer, OAI/OS, APO SF

1. During the next few months we shall be implementing our currently in progress program:

a. Comparative area intelligence collection that we are developing: team and field supervision to meet intelligence gathering requirements, and

b. Preparation for permanent routine intelligence collection in this area.

The success of this latter program will depend very largely upon the degree to which we are able to procure security on all aspects of this activity. In view of the unusual security problems existing in this country, it is believed that special measures to insure the security of this work should be instituted at once. The following is proposed as a solution:

2. a. That the supervision of this program be centralized directly in the office of INIV, at present Major Daniel G. Lee and Brian Hartmann are devoting full time to this assignment. It is proposed as soon as the program of short-range operations is reduced, that these officers will be assisted by certain selected officers of the Operations Section of the Division. In effect there will be a special unit of officers directly responsible to me who will be solely concerned with this activity. The other staff and field personnel of this division will participate only as required to implement specific aspects of the program.

b. That all communications relating to permanent activities be handled as follows:

(1) all communications, both pouch and radio, should carry a special indicator. The code word **SECRET** is suggested.

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(2) All AUSA communications should be made only to the AUSA's office in the field and not to the AUSA's office in the field. All AUSA communications should be made only to the AUSA's office in the field and not to the AUSA's office in the field.

(3) All AUSA communications will be made only to the AUSA's office in the field and not to the AUSA's office in the field. All AUSA communications will be made only to the AUSA's office in the field and not to the AUSA's office in the field.

(4) Civil AUSA communications should be made only to the AUSA's office in the field and not to the AUSA's office in the field. All AUSA communications will be made only to the AUSA's office in the field and not to the AUSA's office in the field.

(5) All personnel working at AUSA's office in the field should be given special security training as they are assigned.

(6) The assistance of the Security Office should be requested with respect to implementing the foregoing measures and to obtaining other security precautions which can be taken.

(7) G-2 Washington should be asked to use the AUSA's office in the field to monitor the highest priority of this activity and related traffic. Attached is a proposed outline to Washington covering the AUSA's office in the field.

(8) If these proposals have your approval, it is requested that directions to implement them be issued as soon as possible.

PAUL L. F. HULLYELL
Lt. Colonel, P. A.
Intelligence Officer, G-2/OT

Attachment

PMH/40

OSB Form 42

(J)

Date 24 Aug. '45

For General Magruder

For discussion with Mr.
Shepardson and such others as
you may deem appropriate and
submission of comments and
recommendations.

RT

Robert Thrun

TAN - SECRET

Office of the Executive Officer

(50449)

SIGNATURE RECORD SHEET

SIGNATURE RECORD SHEET

A stamp at the bottom of the page reads: "A stamp placed by each TROOP upon receipt of THE SECRETARY'S REPORT". To the right of this stamp is the number "603151".

ACCESSION NO. 1001517
DATE 831

ACCESSION DATE: 27 AUG. 1949
OFFICE OR BRANCH: D.O.
00010 BY: WJS

3 AUG. 1955
2274 COP

LUN 3274

[illegible]

RECEIVED
 SIGNATURE
 DATE
 TIME
 INITIALS
 DATE
 TIME

5/11 13:14 1/2 5/11 8:30

READ this document, the PACO must sign on
 a document record to

as the officials concerned have read this document, the TACO must sign on
the bottom of the document and retain it as a permanent record in
the file. The document must be delivered to the nearest Officer Commander to the next TACO
and the Officer Commander must sign the document.
The document was released to the [redacted] (Name of Office) Receipt No. [redacted]

TOP SECRET

To: Lieut. Putzoli

The following is a translation of
the General's notes on the attached.

1. This should be drawn as 033
China plan and not as a ~~test~~
~~war for~~ "branch" ~~from the~~
~~which~~ activity.

2. This selection must be made at
Director's Office.

3.- This will be done under
direction of Mission Chief.

Q/B
Director's Office

033 Form 3054
(3300)

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

16, 32 76
Intelligence
Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director
FROM : E. G. Wilson
SUBJECT:

DATE: 14 August 1945

Shouldn't this, with your comments, be
sent to the Planning Group, General Macruder and
SI..

E.G.W.

TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
CHINA THEATRE
APO 617

REGISTRY NO.

KEY 1 OF 1

SI BRANCH
9 August 1945

MEMORANDUM:

TO: Director, Office of Strategic Services

SUBJECT: Post-war Intelligence Activity, China Theatre

1. Planning is now actively underway for the establishment of a post-war strategic intelligence operation by OSS within this Theatre. While the completion of final and detailed plans is still a matter of weeks, the following is an outline of proposed operating procedures and, subject to your approval, will be implemented at the proper time.

2. The plan for post-war organization envisages the establishment of a central intelligence collection point with an adequate staff at some locality such as HANKING, with sub-offices at various other key points. Information will be secured through native agents and informers on whom dossiers are presently being assembled and through American personnel in the employ of various American owned companies. In this latter regard, it is planned that contacts will be made at once in the United States with various companies who plan post-war business activities within this area; that names and information on personnel to be employed by them will be transmitted to this theatre so that they may be contacted on arrival; and that, in addition, OSS intelligence personnel will make arrangements with American personnel already in China. These arrangements will be on a "partial support" basis, if necessary. It is understood, incidentally, that FBI, working through the Survey of Foreign Experts, is now actively working on preliminary contacts and assembling dossiers.

3. Immediately upon Japanese collapse or withdrawal it is planned to utilize all SI personnel in China to set up the initial organization. Thereafter a weeding-out process will begin and the operation boiled down to permanent personnel, some of whom will unquestionably come from other branches.

4. The following is the basic plan of action:

a. MAIN INTELLIGENCE HEADQUARTERS: The Chief, SI, together with a selected staff, will establish himself in HANKING. The Executive Officer, SI, with a staff will remain with main OSS to carry on general OSS/SI activities not of a post-war nature.

b. FRONTIER INFO-CHINA: The IIC Section, SI, presently located at HUNTING, will establish itself at HANOI, with a small detachment at HAIKOW.

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TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

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c. SOUTH CHINA: SI installations at UUR and ANI will merge, and establish themselves at CANTON, with small detachments at FORT BAYARD, HONGKONG, and SHANGHAI. TWY will establish itself at CHANGSHA and HANGZHANG. PWF will establish itself at SHANGHAI with detachments at ANNY, FOOSHOW and HANGHONG. The CHONGKING SI detachment will leave a small group in CHONGKING and the balance will move to HANGKING.

d. CENTRAL CHINA: GSK and JKS will merge and establish themselves at HANKOW with a detachment at TUNGCHIAN. Buzzard will establish itself at TUNGCHIAO with one man at TUNGKIAN.

e. SOUTH CHINA and MANCHUKIA: The HSIAN SI detachment will establish itself in PEKING, with small detachments in HSIAN and TIENTSIN. Additional personnel will be provided to establish small detachments in MUKDEN, HAIKING and KALON. Phoenix will merge with HSIAN SI for use as directed.

f. KOREA: Eagle Project will establish itself in KHEJO with detachments at HKEJO, FUSAN and SEIKHIN.

g. JAPAN: Part of Eagle project may be used, with additional personnel being obtained from SI, KUNMING, and the United States. The main detachment will be established at TOKYO, with small detachments at OSAKA or KOBE, NAGOYA, SAPPORO, KOCHI, and NAGASAKI.

5. Excess personnel under control of SI, Kunning, will be utilized where necessary as the situation develops.

6. The above-named detachments will operate as outlined in paragraph 3 hereof. As the organization is perfected and nets established either through native or American sources, certain of these installations can be moved, curtailed or eliminated.

7. Estimated cost of maintaining such a post-war network in the area described will be from \$1,500,000 to \$2,500,000 per annum, assuming that all permanent personnel are in civilian status.

8. It is recommended in the strongest terms that the implementation and, so far as is possible, the permanent operation of a post-war intelligence activity in China and Japan be accomplished by and under the direction of SI, China, personnel who have had practical experience in the creation and establishment of an active information service in this theatre.

9. It is further recommended that at the appropriate time the SI Branch, OMS/OT, be authorized to take such personnel as may be necessary for such work from any of the other branches it may deem necessary.

TOP SECRET

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10. It is requested that if the foregoing appears to offer a basically sound method of operation that your general approval be initialed hereon.


PAUL L. E. HALLIWELL
Lieutenant Colonel, F. A.
Chief, SI Branch, GNS/UT

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DSS Form 1102

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Accession No.

Date Rec'd.

BIGelow

To	Room No.	Date		Officer's Initials	Comments
		Rec'd.	Fwd'd.		
1. LT COL Hoffman		22 1955		<i>[initials]</i>	Each - Please refer to to Charles W. Hoffman
2. MR CHESTON				<i>[initials]</i>	
3. Col. Downing				<i>[initials]</i>	
4. Mrs. O'Donnell					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					

Each comment should be numbered to correspond with number in To column.
 A line should be drawn across sheet under each comment.
 Officer Designations should be used in To column.
 Each Officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing.
 Action desired or action taken should be indicated in Comments column.
 Routing sheet should always be returned to Registry.
 For Officer Designations see separate sheet.

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089 PLAM 0601a

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Date 18 Jan 1961

To: Mr. Chaston

The attached was received in
the pouch from the General.

A copy is being circulated to
General Magruder, SI, and RAA.

John W. Cunningham
John H. Auchincloss
1st Lt., JAGD

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Office of the Secretariat

(9139)

10 January 1961

Major General Sean H. Duce
U. S. Military Liaison
Hanoi, Laos

Dear Duce:

Here is a paper prepared by one of our men on
a problem that is shared by the Americans and ourselves.
I thought you might want to look at it.

WILLIAM J. DONOVAN
Major General
Director

Enclosure



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the Austro-Hungarian frontier to Slovenia and the Adriatic. Failure to hold this line will result in the loss of Austria and northern Italy. The defense of this line will be greatly strengthened if the enemy can reinforce it at the expense of the other two southern fronts.

(a) The enemy continues his withdrawal from Yugoslavia in an effort to extricate the divisions engaged there and oppose them to the Russian advance. Several divisions brought out of Yugoslavia are believed to be engaged in Hungary.

(b) The Italian front is capable of supplying reinforcements to the Hungarian. Two divisions transferred from Italy have already been identified in Hungary. Withdrawal to the Adige can release several more, and, if necessary, the enemy can withdraw entirely from Italy.

3. Enemy Supply and Withdrawal Routes

(a) Italy

All supplies reaching the enemy forces in Italy must be brought over the two trans-Alpine routes, the Brenner and Tarvisio. Withdrawal from Italy can be carried out only over the same routes, supplemented by two northeastern routes leading to Slovenia.

(b) Yugoslavia

A single rail line (Graz-Maribor-Zagreb-Brod) carries all supplies reaching Army Group E in Yugoslavia. The escape corridor is now narrowed down to two roads. Withdrawal is constantly harassed by Partisan ground and Allied air attacks.

(c) Hungary

The Drava-Danube front is served by a more substantial rail system, including the networks of lines passing through Vienna.

4. Opportunity for Allied Air Action

The southern fronts present the unique combination of large enemy forces, served by a vulnerable communications system, in a theater where Allied air power can operate freely at long range. Allied air action, properly conceived and executed, is capable of:

(a) Drying up the flow of supplies to Italy and Yugoslavia, and interfering with the supply of the Danube-Drava sector;

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(b) Materially slowing up troop movements from Italy and Yugoslavia, and attacking the troops themselves.

Plans to accomplish these objectives are now in preparation.

5. Intelligence and Operational Liaison Requirements

Execution of these plans is contingent on:

(a) Full intelligence liaison between our air forces and the Russian and Yugoslav ground forces operating in the theater. This liaison implies, as a minimum:

(1) Full, detailed, and rapid exchange of information on enemy order of battle and troop movements.

(2) Exchange of information on movement of enemy supplies, state of his supply lines, and effect of our air action on them.

In addition it would be highly desirable, if possible:

(3) To improve Russian and Yugoslav intelligence procurement on these subjects, especially by prisoner-of-war interrogation. Russian intelligence methods are geared to the tactical area within 100 km. of the front, which is the range of Russian air operations. Partisan intelligence appears to be similarly limited.

(b) Operational liaison with Russians and Yugoslav ground forces.

Effective coordination between air and ground forces requires exchange of intentions. For air operations close to the front, prompt exchange of day-to-day intentions is needed. Planning of longer range air operations in the southeast requires a general knowledge of Russian ground plans.

6. Present Liaison Facilities

(a) With Russians

The most satisfactory field liaison with the Russians was established in Bucharest between Second Ukrainian Army (rear echelon) and representatives of GCHQ and the air force. This liaison was initiated by the Russian command in the field.

When Gen. Vorobiev, of Second Ukrainian Army, moved out, this relation was terminated. Since this and related questions are under negotiation at the Washington-Moscow level, the field commanders are no longer free to re-establish relations

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at the operational level.

(5) With Partisans

In accordance with a decision reached at the highest level, Balkan Air Force, a British organization, controls all Allied air operations in Yugoslavia, including operations by U.S. Fifteenth (Strategic) and Twelfth (Tactical) Air Forces.

An inevitable result of this arrangement is that intelligence and planning is geared to the capabilities of BAF, although BAF is capable of 180-200 sorties per day, all at short range, while Fifteenth can put up over 1000 sorties and can cover all of Yugoslavia with both fighters and heavy bombers. There is no direct channel for transmission of Partisan requests to Fifteenth AAF, or Fifteenth AAF intentions to the Partisans.

7. Recommendations

If the opportunity for effective air action is to be seized, the following action is required:

(a) Liaison with Russians

The operational commands in the theater, the American (or Allied) air forces (MAAF and Fifteenth), and the Russian ground forces (Second and Third Ukrainian Armies), should be authorized by their respective high commands to establish direct liaison on a working level.

(b) Operations in Yugoslavia

(1) Facilities for procurement of operational intelligence required for Allied air operations should be provided by strengthening of our mission, and by tailoring Partisan intelligence to our requirements. Such action requires a high degree of cooperation by the Partisans. This cooperation, it is believed, would be forthcoming if it were clear that our air forces proposed to operate effectively in Yugoslavia.

(2) Machinery for rapid communication of intelligence and operational intentions between Yugoslavia and all the Allied air forces operating over Yugoslavia must be established.

(3) It would probably be desirable to increase the latitude of Fifteenth AAF to plan its operations in Yugoslavia. It is possible that American units of Tactical Air Force now based in Greece may move to bases which would permit them to operate over Yugoslavia. In that case, the same remark applies to them.

(4) and possibly (2) require modification of decisions made in Washington some time ago. These decisions referred basically to American foreign policy and inter-Allied relations with

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respect to Yugoslavia. The reason for modifying them at this time is that the advance of the Russian armies has completely altered the military position. Air operations in Yugoslavia have acquired a far broader significance than close support to the Partisan ground forces. They are now an integral element in Allied strategy in the entire southern theater of operations.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE 6 JUNE 45

FROM

US MILITARY MISSION MOSCOW, RUSSIA

TO

WAR DEPARTMENT

~~OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES~~

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#M 24572. TO GEORGE T. ROBINSON OSG REPEAT TO BISSELL, WOODI SIGNED
DEANE.

REFERENCE YOUR WAR 90893. THERE IS NO BREAKDOWN OF
MILITARY EXPENDITURES BY CATEGORIES FOR THE BUDGET 1945. THE PLANNED
1944 BUDGET WAS 120.4 BILLION RUBLES. THE ACTUAL EXPENDITURE WAS
137.9 BILLION. THE PLANNED 1945 EXPENDITURE IS 137.9. THE MILITARY
EXPENDITURES FOR 1944 WERE 52.5 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL BUDGET. THE
PLANNED 1945 BUDGET IS 45 PERCENT OF THE PLANNED TOTAL BUDGET.

SOVIETS ANNOUNCED ON JUNE 1ST LARGE-SCALE CONSTRUCTION
TO TAKE PLACE IN SEAPORTS, MENTIONED ODESSA, NOVOROSSIIISK, LENINGRAD
AND RIGA TO BE REBUILT IN 1945. THEIR PLANS ALSO CALL FOR ENLARGEMENT
OF PORTS IN FAR EAST IN 1945. BELIEVED NO LARGE-SCALE SHIP CONSTRU-
TION PROGRAM FOR THIS YEAR. INCREASED BUDGET IS NOT ATTRIBUTABLE TO
PRICE INCREASE AS PRICES, IN FACT, ARE SHOWING A DECREASING TREND.

WAR PLANTS AND INDUSTRIAL PLANTS ARE BOTH STATE OWNED.
THEREFORE NO WRITE OFF OF SUCH PLANTS SHOULD BE NECESSARY OR LIKELY.
THERE HAS BEEN NO ANNOUNCEMENT OR OTHER INDICATIONS OF LARGE-SCALE
RECONVERSION OF PLANTS TO CONSUMER GOODS. THERE ARE INDICATIONS OF
CONTINUATION OF OUTPUT OF TANKS, LOCOMOTIVES, STEEL AND OTHER BASIC
MATERIALS AT A WAR-TIME LEVEL.

THERE HAS BEEN ORDERED A MOBILIZATION FOR SUMMER
TRAINING OF ALL BOYS OF THE EIGHTH, NINTH, AND TENTH SCHOOL GRADES.
WITH THE VERY EXTENSIVE SOVIET OCCUPATIONAL AREAS AND THE LESSONS OF
DESTRUCTION BROUGHT BY PARTISAN ACTION ON WEAK OCCUPATIONAL FORCE,
WE EXPECT THE SOVIET OCCUPATIONAL FORCES TO BE LARGE AND TO BE SUPPORTED
BY LARGE RESERVES. HOWEVER, WE HAVE RELIABLE INFORMATION THAT THE
SUPREME PRESIDIUM WILL AUTHORIZE A 40% DEMOBILIZATION OF THE ARMED
FORCES IN THE WEST ON 23RD JUNE.

THE SOVIETS ARE EXTRA VIGILANT WITH GUARDS IN ALL TERRI-
TORY. IT IS FORBIDDEN TO COPY OR REPRODUCE ANYTHING
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COUN. 5/12/22-2811

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FROM **RUSSIA**TO **DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES****RECEIVED****SECRET**

TORY. THIS, IN THE LARGE AREAS HELD, WOULD ALSO REQUIRE THE DIS-
POSITION OF LARGE FORCES.

ANY OF THE FOLLOWING LINES OF ACTION MIGHT ACCOUNT
FOR A CONTINUED HIGH MILITARY BUDGET, SOME EVIDENCE SUPPORTS EACH:

1. FIGURES ON MILITARY EXPENDITURES FOR 1945 WERE
DRAWN UP BEFORE THE END OF HOSTILITIES. IT WILL BE NOTED THAT THE
PLANNED 1945 EXPENDITURES ARE IDENTICAL WITH THE ACTUAL EXPENDITURES
OF 1944. THEREFORE THE 1945 FIGURE MAY BE AN ARBITRARY ONE SET UP
WITH AN IDEA OF LATER ADJUSTMENT.

2. A CONTINUATION OF MANUFACTURE OF MATERIAL TO
THOROUGHLY MODERNIZE THE WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT OF THE NATIONAL TOTAL
ARMY AND BRING ITS MATERIAL RESERVE INTO PROPER PROPORTION.

3. THE MAINTENANCE OF THE PRESENT MODILIZED MILITARY
STRENGTH FOR OCCUPATIONAL AND POLITICAL PURPOSES.

4. THE POSSIBILITY OF LARGE-SCALE OPERATIONS IN THE
FAR EAST.

5. THE ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPPING THE ENTIRE NATION
AS A POWERFUL MILITARY OLIGARCH POWER.

6. THE BASIC MILITARY DOCTRINE ON WHICH THE SOVIET
ARMY IS FOUNDED AND TRAINED DEMANDS THAT GOVERNMENTAL BUDGETS SHOW
MINIMUM CHANGES IN TRANSITION FROM WAR TO PEACE OR PEACE TO WAR AND
THAT THE TAX STRUCTURE REMAIN UNCHANGED.

7. LEND LEASE, BRITISH AND CANADIAN AID AND REPARA-
TIONS PAYMENTS FROM FINLAND, ROMANIA AND HUNGARY, ALL OR IN PART,
MAY BE INCLUDED AS A CHARGE AGAINST MILITARY EXPENDITURES IN ADJUSTING
THESE CREDITS WITH OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES.

ACTION: O99

INFORMATION: OPD, G-2

OM-111-5581

(6 JUN 45) DTG: 060940

TOR: 0937 7 JUNE 45

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8 APRIL 45

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#21174. TO CHESTON ONLY FROM SHEPARDSON AND 109.

SECRET

1. PLEASE CONTACT FRANK WISNER 81 AND SHEPARDSON'S SECRETARY RENE HOOD IMMEDIATELY.

2. WISNER AFTER CONSULTING HOOD SHOULD CABLE URGENT TODAY WHETHER HIS MEMORANDUM ON RUSSIAN MATERIALS CAUGHT SATURDAY'S POUCH FOR LONDON, AND WISNER HOOD SHOULD PARTICULARLY STATE WHETHER QUESTIONNAIRES ON RUSSIAN SUBJECT MATTER ASSEMBLED BY LANGHAM WERE INCLUDED.

3. ALSO QUESTIONNAIRE SENT TO ROUMANIA.

4. ALL THREE FILES NEEDED SOONEST.

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TON 1324

3 APRIL 45

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OS Form 4131

Date 10/28

To: General Donovan

If you will indicate your
view I will tell Dr. Langsam
what you desire in this matter.

I told him I was ^{EJP}
because I don't want to
be done by Langsam.

Office of the Executive Officer

(93049)

SECRET**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES**WASHINGTON, D. C.
23 October 1944

TO: Brig. Gen. William J. Donovan, Director, OSS

THROUGH: Mr. John M. O'Garra, Chief SI

FROM: Dr. Walter G. Langer

SUBJECT: Intelligence Objectives

In the compilation of Intelligence Objectives for Germany, Poland, and the Baltic States, care was taken to avoid including anything which might seem to involve Intelligence Activities aimed at the U.S.S.R. This was done in the belief that such activities vis-a-vis any of our Allies was forbidden to SI.

Your cable (OUT 20285) of 14 October 1944 to Cairo appears to reflect a somewhat different attitude with respect to the collection of Intelligence concerning the U.S.S.R.

Please let me know if the type of Intelligence outlined in this cable is also to be collected, wherever feasible, from the Baltic States, Poland, and Germany as bases. If so, I shall promptly forward amendments to the lists of Intelligence Objectives previously sent to the field.

W. C. L.
W. O. L.

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RUSH**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES****AIR DISPATCH**

OUT 21873

DATE

31 October 1944

FROM: EXECUTIVE OFFICE AT

TO: CAIRO, CAIRO

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

NUMBER: WZ 300

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R: A, SI, HANNOVER, ALBTO,

X: S, HANNOVER, ALBTO, HANNOVER

✓ To Adrich, Cairo, for Harper, Istanbul from Executive Officer.

This dispatch contains detailed statement of all types of information that we should like you to obtain, if it is possible to do so. Our cable #42034 of 14 October was based on following memoranda from our branches here:

1. Red Army rations, clothing, physical condition.
2. Russian Occupation Policies on Economic Questions.
 - a. Quantities of foodstuffs and other supplies acquired by Russians in Balkans; amounts of supplies acquired by Red Army, shipped to Russia.
 - b. Administrative policies used to acquire supplies (requisitioning, purchase in open market, etc.).
 - c. Financial arrangements: Amounts of occupation currency issued; exchange rates; prices paid for supplies; payments on reparations account.
 - d. Penetration of persons who employed forced Russian labor; Russian policies with respect to managerial personnel in general.
 - e. To what extent are Russian administrators managing railways, utilities, industrial enterprises, etc.
 - f. To what extent are industrial enterprises and agricultural estates being confiscated by local authorities or by Russians; how are these properties being operated.
3. Transport

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a. Condition and capacity of ports of Burgas, Varna, Constanta, Braila, and Galati.

b. Condition and capacity of major railroad and river routes from these ports to the active fronts; rail gauges and clearances; rolling stock park.

c. Any information available on rail, river, and road arteries of Bessarabia, northern Bukovina, and Trans-Nistru, and condition of ports of Odessa and Nikolaev.

1. Special Economic Subjects

a. The status and output of oil wells and refineries in present volume of shipments to Bessarabia, Bukovina, pre-1939 Russia.

b. Information on location, administration, and production of industrial plants in Moldavian SSR, Chernovitsky oblast, and Izmail oblast.

c. Russian Economic Capabilities: Documentary or other intelligence on past, current and prospective output of Russian industry and agriculture; Russian labor and transport conditions.

2. Local Governments and Politics

a. Political parties; programs, membership, and influence; attitude of Soviet representatives toward them.

b. Soviet relationship to the national governments; extent of Soviet participation in the selection; amount of Soviet

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RUSH**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES****AIR DISPATCH****PAGE 3**

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influence in the government; Soviet willingness to permit government to exercise wide power.

c. War criminals and collaborators: types of person punished and nature of crime; method of punishment (summary execution, execution after trial, imprisonment, confiscation of property, removal from office, etc.); purpose of punishment (revenge for crimes, to remove potential enemies, to deter other war criminals in Axis territory); punishment by Balkan government or by Soviets.

7. Inter-Allied Cooperation

a. Allied Control Commission: extent of authority; personnel; organization; relative strength of Russian, British, and American delegations.

b. Soviet attitude on relief: extent of relief desired; willingness to let URRRA administer it; political aspects of relief administration (favor to pro-Soviet recipients, or to anti-Communist recipients).

c. Soviet attitude toward Allied Liaison Officers in Greece, Yugoslavia, and Albania.

8. Soviet Administrative Methods and Attitudes

a. Attitude of Soviet officials and military: lapses of discipline; personal attitude of individuals toward local people; personal relations between Russians and Asians; official attitude toward Allied officials, intelligence teams, etc.

b. Extent of Soviet control of communications: cables, telegraph, wireless; censorship; Ministry of foreign news correspondents; admission of foreign news correspondents.

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- c. Soviet political propaganda: nature, extent, and methods.
- d. Cultural propaganda and Soviet attitude toward local culture.
- e. Soviet attitude toward local religious bodies.
- 9. Military Occupation Policy of Soviets
 - a. Garrisoning of strategic localities.
 - b. Disarming of local troops: total, or restricted to confiscation of planes, tanks, etc.
 - c. Leasing or occupation of long-term bases, airfields, etc.

II. FROM SOFIA.

A. Intelligence on Bulgaria.

Behavior of the Russian occupying forces; relations between Russians and native population; Russian attitude toward Bulgarian political groups; especially Communists; indications of Russian long-range political intentions in Bulgaria; relations between Russians and Western Allies on the Control Commission; attitudes of Bulgarian regime toward three major Allies.

Information on all political parties, groups, and personalities in and out of power; developments in the land problem, the peasant movement, the labor movement, the urban-rural antagonism and its political repercussions; political position of the Church, of manufacturing and financial interests, and especially of the army.

Political attitudes of all groups toward the problem of Macedonia

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Thrace, toward the peace settlement, toward relations with Greece, Yugoslavia, and Turkey, and toward future Balkan cooperation and federation.

Presence, numbers and activities of German forces and of known Bulgarian collaborationists; organization, orientation, and behavior of the police; trials of war criminals, property transfers, the Jewish question.

All industrial, agricultural, and commercial statistics.

B. Intelligence on other countries.

All available information on the situation in Macedonia and Thrace, on Greece, and on Yugoslavia.

I. Internal Political Intelligence Objectives:

A. Political Factors:

1. Leadership, strength, and activity of the various political parties or groups, in particular:

Communists
Social Democrats
Left Agrarians (Pladne)
Agrarians
Zveno
Democrats
Radicals
Liberals

or any other party that may form. In particular, information should be obtained about the degree of cooperation between any parties or groups of parties, such as the Fatherland Front.

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2. Activities of groups sympathizing with the movement of the National Government of Alexander Tsankov.
3. Political groups within the Army, such as the Military League.
4. Separatist pressure groups, such as the Macedonians, in particular IMRO, but also the Federalists.
- B. Constitutional and Political Structures:
 1. Attitude of parties and the people toward socialism.
 2. Republican movement.
 3. Pastors supporting the monarchy.
 4. Plans for a revision of the Tirnovo Constitution.

II. Foreign Political Intelligence Objectives:

1. Relations with the Great Powers:
 1. Degree of dependence upon the U.S.S.R.
 - (a) of the Government
 - (b) of political parties.
 2. Popular reaction to connection with the U.S.S.R.
 - (a) groups favoring this connection and their influence
 - (b) strength of opposition to this policy.
 3. Western Orientation (England, France, and United States)
 4. Italian influence.

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5. German influence.
- B. Relations with neighboring countries:
 1. Attitude of Government and people toward a South Slav Federation.
 2. Attitude towards a Balkan Federation.
 3. Relations with Greece; settlement of borders; question of Aegean outlet.
 4. Relations with Yugoslavia; Macedonian question.
 5. Problem of Turkish minority.
 6. Relations with Rumania; settlement of Dobrudja claims; Exchange of population.

XIX. Economic Intelligence Objectives:

- A. Trends toward Socialism:
 1. Economic effects of possible socialization.
 2. Strength of Cooperative Movement.
- B. Nationalization:
 1. Development of natural resources
 2. Industrialization of agriculture.

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C. Financial Policy:

1. Internal financial structure.
2. Development of popular and cooperative banks.
3. Attitude of Government toward foreign capital.

IV. Security Objectives:

1. Political activities of demobilized officers.
2. Activities of veterans organizations, and of nationalist sporting organizations.
3. Activities of IMRO, or similar terrorist organizations.
1. Concealment of assets or transfers of any kind from Germany to neutral countries since 1933 or attempts to do so.
2. Manipulation of assets of financial institutions.
3. Lists of personnel employed in financial institutions in regard to political reliability and unreliability.
4. All information on transfer of assets from occupied countries to Germany since 1940.
5. German holdings of foreign securities and participation in non-German business.
6. Emigration of prominent Germans which can best be accounted for on financial grounds.

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7. All details of foreign exchange operations and hoarding of foreign currencies.

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TOD: 10/26/44 10:00 AM

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SECRETARY, NSA, ST. LOUIS
MAGNITUDE, K-2

LABORATORY: K-10

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#42034. To Algeria, Cairo, for Harper, Istanbul, and to Olavin, Gannetta, for Wisner, Bucharest. From 109.

We are forwarding to you by air dispatch a summary of the kind of intelligence we desire. We want you to get everything you can on the subjects listed below, which we mention for your guidance:

1. The condition of the Soviet forces, from physical standpoint. What amount of supplies and foodstuffs they consume in the Balkans and send to the USSR. The means they use to obtain supplies; also methods of reparation payments, punishment of war guilt, garrisoning; of strategic places, occupation of long-term bases, and disarmament of local troops.
2. The Soviet control over government, utilities, agriculture, communications, propaganda, and industry -- its nature and extent. Soviet views, policies, and relations toward the local governments, the native population, religious and political groups of the occupied country, local industries, British and American representatives, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, and the AOC.
3. How the latter body is organized and what sort of people are on it. How far its authority goes. What relations exist between its members and between it and local governments.
4. Whatever intelligence you can get on the condition of the harbors of Nikolaev and Odessa, and on the highway, river, and rail network of Transdniestria, northern Bukovina, and Bessarabia. The condition and capacity of the harbors of Constanta, Galati, Iurgiu, Braila, and Varna, as well as information on the river and rail routes from these cities to active fronts. Also material on factories and similar installations in Moldavian SSR, Israel.

3. The Soviet control over government, utilities, agriculture, communications, propaganda, and industry -- its nature and extent. Soviet views, policies, and relations toward the local governments, the native population, religious and political groups of the occupied country, local industries, British and American representatives, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, and the AGO.

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DATE 10/13/44

FROM: OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

TO:

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Oblast and Chernovitsy Oblast.

5. The overall political setup in Rumania or Bulgaria, political parties, and people both in and out of power. Where business, the Church, and the army stand politically. The status of former and currently active collaborationists and Fascist movements. A description of labor groups and their activities. The treatment of the war guilty and of minorities. Opinions held by both the population and the officials on a republican or monarchic form of government, a federation of the Balkan countries, relations with the great powers and with adjoining nations, domestic social policies. In connection with Bulgaria, the question of the peace settlement, of Thrace and Macedonia.

6. Complete statistics on the agriculture, exports, commerce, industries, taxation and finance of Rumania and Bulgaria, with particular stress on the oil industry. Whatever material can be obtained on Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Poland. Information on German manpower, munitions, and industry. Financial operations and transfer of assets between Germany and other nations. In addition, material on agriculture, transportation, labor, and industry in the USSR.

TOP: 10/14/44 10:10 p.m.


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To: COLONEL EUXTON

FOR YOUR INFORMATION



WJD

Director's Office

(9968)

18, 409
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X ~~Defense, Navy, Air~~
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X ~~State~~
X ~~Chadria~~
X ~~Middle East~~
X ~~Middle East~~

SPECIAL REPORT

FOR

GENERAL DONOVAN'S

EYES

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: 31 September 1944

TO : General Donovan
 FROM : Major O. S. Coon
 SUBJECT: Intelligence Work in Arab Countries.

1. THE ORIGINAL PROPOSITION

Last June General Donovan indicated to me that he would like to have some very much under cover intelligence done in Saudi Arabia. I later determined from Colonel Duxton that this did not need to be started before the end of this year. I have been giving the subject considerable thought ever since, and have done a little preparatory work during my last trip to North Africa.

2. THE WORLD OF ISLAM, A WHOLE

The first thing that occurs to me is that Saudi Arabia itself is not an isolated field, nor, from the intelligence standpoint, a self-contained unit. Ibn Saud is the greatest figure in the world of Islam, and Moslems everywhere look to him as the great leader of a free and holy motherland of true believers. His existence gives Moslems in conquered countries hope and faith in their eventual independence, but not all of them love him. To Saudi Arabia come pilgrims from every Moslem land, who go home imbued with a holy aura that grows the longer they live. Jidda, the pilgrim center, must be a focal point for intelligence, since it is the clearing house, in peace time, for Moslems from points as far distant as Morocco and Japan.

In Saudi Arabia there is not complete harmony. As a puritan, Ibn Saud has always considered much of the ceremony carried on in the Holy places of the Hedjaz to be pagan abominations, and the pilgrimage as a whole a pagan rite. For a number of years after his conquest of the Hedjaz, Ibn Saud forbade the pilgrimage, and the Hedjaz people, who derived their income from this traffic, grew very bitter. When he later restored the rite, Ibn Saud imposed many restrictions, and posted guards at the holy places to prevent practices which he considered idolatrous. A considerable amount of blood was shed, and many pilgrims went home hating the Wahabi King. In Jidda, in 1934, several local Arabs damned Ibn Saud in my presence, although they were risking their lives in so doing.

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The Yemenites abominate Ibn Saud. He is not popular among Shia and other not fully orthodox sects. His imposition of Koranic restrictions against silk and gold jewelry, his firm attitude against tobacco, alcohol, and shaving the beard, are not universally popular. Many Moslems do not like to pray five times a day.

The Moslem world has elements of both unity and disunity, as has any other universe. It is a variegated whole, with Jidda, and Mekka as the focal area.

In the past, not all Moslem movements have come from Arabia. Most of them, after the initial Arab expansion, have originated elsewhere: in Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Iraq, etc. The more arid regions of Arabia are to the Moslem world what Maine and Vermont are to the United States; rugged lands from which simple and rugged people go forth to fatter lands to enrich the personnel of the latter regions. In this sense they are like Scotland and Ireland to the British Empire.

If we are to have intelligence from Saudi Arabia, it will be of the greatest value to the Government of the United States only if it is a part of intelligence from the Moslem world as a whole.

3. THE LONG RANGE PROBLEM

The long range problem concerned with the Moslem world may be stated as follows:

Between 1821 and 1913 the Turks gradually withdrew from North Africa and Europe with the result that for a century European powers fought for spheres of influence over the vacated territories, with the result that with the growth of Nationalism in the Balkans, a number of independent states appeared, which became spheres of contest among Austria, England and Russia and produced six conflicts of which four were major wars.

Since the withdrawal of the Turks in 1918 from their Empire outside of Anatolia, conditions similar to those of the past century have been giving rise to similar results, and we may expect disturbances. The independent states of Iraq, Yemen, Transjordan, Saudi Arabia, the trucial sheikhdoms, Syria, and the Lebanon are already in existence and have given rise to Nationalist movements which strongly affect the aspirations in the regions which, after the Turkish withdrawal, fell to France and Italy. The Atlantic Charter has profoundly

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affected the thinking of these people. As in the past, so in the future, wars are bound to rise in those areas of primary disturbance, and it is distinctly to the interest of the United States Government to know, from American sources, what is going on in these regions.

As in the past again, these areas are fast becoming a region of conflict among the surviving world powers, and the struggle for spheres of interest has not only begun but has already in some areas, such as Morocco, Iran and Afghanistan, taken a critical form.

These matters affect the United States for the following basic reasons:

- (1) Experience has taught us that the United States cannot stay out of World Wars.
- (2) The United States has several material interests at stake.
 - (a) Oil
 - (b) Airbases
 - (c) Future markets

Of our material interests, oil is the first. We must maintain the safety of our sources of supply and the uninterrupted flow of oil to the United States. The American oil interests are dependent upon the continuance of the Ibn Saud dynasty and/or the full knowledge of who may succeed him if his dynasty falls. The Rashidi Clan, rivals of the Saudis, are by no means out of the picture and must be the object of special attention. Turkish influence with the Rashidis should be known as well as Russian, which has recently appeared.

The future of American world airlines is dependent upon securing the needed airfields, some of which we have taken over on limited tenure through the war. Many of the primary routes go directly through Moslem territory, from Morocco to the Philippines. We probably cannot get all the bases we need from the English and the Dutch to operate in competition with their own lines, but we can cultivate the independent and semi-independent Moslem countries with a view to securing special concessions from them.

- 3 -

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The demand of Moslem peoples for Western merchandise, which existed long before the war, is expected to increase greatly, and it is essential that in the reconversion of American industry after the war new outlets be found and developed. In exploring these outlets, commercial firms usually rely on consular reports which in many cases tend to be extremely superficial. An intelligence service of the nature proposed, working closely with the people, should be able to furnish leads of great value to our manufacturing and exporting interests. This service would be comparable to that of the SIS, which has in the past performed a similar service with great success for British commercial interests.

Returning to the purely political sphere, since, as is generally accepted, we must abandon the idea of remaining aloof from world affairs, we must have some knowledge of conditions in the critical areas that we may be able (a) to prevent hostilities before they start, (b) to localize them and prevent their spread, or (c) if these conflicts can be neither prevented nor localized, to be fully prepared for them well in advance. This knowledge can be secured only through a special Moslem intelligence service of our own.

The totality of Moslem intelligence must be secured by agents trained in Moslem activities and Moslem affairs. A report from Jidda, for example, which ties in with events in Morocco, will lead only to confusion if our report from Morocco is filtered through the brain of a French Agent, or of an American whose interests are chiefly with Spanish and French affairs.

An example of this may be cited from my recent trip to Tunis. There Lt. Taquay, an officer of the United States Army and Mr. Springs' assistant, took a document written by an Arab about the Destour party and its aspirations and changed its meaning completely, making it appear pro-French instead of being a more or less objective statement of French abuses from a Moslem point of view. Taquay then submitted this to me to use in my work. Mr. Springs supplied me with the original document which Taquay had altered.

We must, therefore, if we want a clear picture of events in the Moslem world, have a Moslem department of our own.

4. SUMMARY OF REASONS FOR THE NEED OF A MOSLEM DEPARTMENT

- a) The fact that the Moslem world holds the seeds of future wars.
- b) The American oil interests in the Middle East.

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- c) Our extensive postwar air-lines in Moslem countries.
- d) The general expansion of American trade in the Moslem world.
- e) The presence of a hostile Spain athwart the Straits of Gibraltar.
- f) The constant disturbance of Moslems by the French, who render them hostile everywhere to the Allied Cause.
- g) The future of our relations with India, Indonesia, and China.
- h) The fact that the Japanese Moslem bureau, active for the last sixty years, has already gone underground to function after the war.
- i) The probability that the German equivalent bureau may soon do the same.
- j) The intensive interest of Soviet Russia in Moslem lands, particularly Iran, Afghanistan, Syria and Iraq, and in Arabia itself.
- k) The fact that the British SIS has already set up a Moslem school in Jerusalem.
- l) The need of competent people to deal with the influence of Lt. Col. Philby.
- m) The need of internal security of Moslem intelligence within our own organization.
- n) The need of having only Moslem-trained personnel handle Moslem affairs.

Some of these points which have not yet been dealt with require a little elaboration as follows:

b. THE SPANISH PROBLEM

As long as Franco stays in power we have a strategic menace to our shipping lines through the Straits of Gibraltar. Furthermore, Spanish Morocco has served and may continue to serve as a base for anti-American activities elsewhere. Our present excellent relations with Moslem organizations in Spanish Morocco should be kept alive as a security measure.

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SECRET6. THE FRENCH PROBLEM

In all their colonies and protectorates, the French seek to keep the people disunited and at odds among themselves. They exploit them so unmercifully that these populations are restive and liable to provoke conflicts which might grow to world proportions and thus involve the United States.

7. THE RUSSIAN INTEREST

We know that the Russians have been actively engaged in propaganda in the Near East, but we have uncertain knowledge of their objectives. It may be anti-British in a commercial sense, it may be anti-imperialistic in general from an ideological point of view. Whatever the cause, it has appeared in the Near East and is more active than most intelligence agencies realize. One of the principal channels of Russian intelligence and propaganda runs through the Armenian colonies of Syria and Egypt. It may be indicative of Russia's growing concern with the Moslem world that they have sent a Russian Moslem to Cairo, a man who speaks classical Arabic perfectly, and who charms the Uleyma and other pundits of the El Azhar and the innermost religious circles. Needless to say, he uses this cover most effectively for Soviet propaganda.

8. THE BRITISH SCHOOL

The British, I have recently learned, have had much the same idea as ours, for they have recently set up a school for Moslem work for the SIS in Jerusalem. Bertram Thomas, the famous explorer, a man whom I know very well, is in charge. Freya Stark is in Jerusalem, and so is Pat Deville, who took over Capt. Shakespeare's job and files; these two cannot be living in Jerusalem for their health. Col. Glubb and Gibb may be expected to be in close contact with this group.

9. THE PHILBY MENACE

In Arabia itself, Lt. Col. St. John Philby presents a problem. He is a British Moslem, a naturalized citizen of Saudi Arabia, and the closest man in Arabia to Ibn Saud. In 1941 Philby, known to be pro-German, left Jidda on a ship for America, where he was to give a series of lectures. Philby is chronically broke and undoubtedly needs the money. At Karachi, where the ship stopped for a short visit, Philby stepped ashore, and was immediately arrested. He spent about

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a year in a concentration camp in Karachi, and was then released. He returned to Arabia and has since been on the payroll of the Standard of California. Philby is an extremely jealous man. He considers Arabia his private preserve as far as all scientific work is concerned, and in 1954 he influenced the king to prevent us from doing field work in physical anthropology there. Any archaeologist, anthropologist, geographer, geologist, etc., who comes to Saudi Arabia to work will have to reckon with Philby, and if Philby cannot wreck the expedition politically, he will do it by other and less agreeable means. It must always be remembered that Philby can get any number of Arabs to do any dirty work he desires for him, and that he is an insanely jealous man. Only exceedingly well-trained men can hope to handle the Philby problem.

10. THE SECURITY PROBLEM

The primary requisite of any project, or any department, which may be organized to deal with Islamic affairs, is absolute security. This means in particular security from our present allies, almost all of whom have fingers in the Muslim pie and who have shown themselves particularly anxious to keep us out. The sensitiveness of the French in Morocco, who consider it a major crime if an American speaks to a native of any prominence, is well known. The same is true in Tunis. In July I was in General Maet's office with Mr. Springs, when the general's private secretary asked Springs: "Who is the American who was seen speaking to Didi so-and-so on the street last Thursday at such and such a place? None of our agencies has been able to find out."

We may count on the French to do all in their power to thwart any program we may start. We can also count on the British, I believe, to do the same, because of the conflict of our commercial interests in the Middle East, and because of the tension in India, where the recent international incident of Mr. Phillips' letter to the President serves as an illustration. We can probably count on the Dutch as well, for they have a Nationalist problem just as the French do. The Chinese have a Moslem problem, too, and so do the Russians. In both these latter countries there is considerable friction on this basis.

Security of the degree needed cannot be maintained on the present premises or under the present organizational scheme. Our organization is full of British, Dutch, and other nationals or individuals with foreign political prejudices. No organization of this size, with the later stage which this organization has, could fail to be penetrated in this fashion. The other day while I was having parts of my Teroh report typed by security-checked stenographers, a Frenchman saw the word "Pinkney" on a document. She exclaimed,

- 7 -

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"Ohhh-Zat Pinkeye -- I hato heemi! I wael not type spyzing about heemi!" That woman was a full member of our organization entitled to handle secret material. In Algiers, as I can explain if needed, we have few secrets from the French Government, and as a result of this penetration, I and several others are on the French black list.

The interest that SIS has taken in our affairs from the beginning would be, if possible, increased if they had reason to believe that we were interested specifically in Moslem problems; and under the present set-up they would soon find it out with all the Britishers in our buildings, and all the dates between SIS women and OSS men in other theaters.

To maintain proper security, and to ensure any measure of success, we must run the Islam show from other buildings, and with a very limited personnel, and we must report to the top only. The rest of the organization must not know of our existence. This means that we cannot normally use the processing and service departments, and must keep our people out of the OSS buildings unless they have some cover reason for entering them. It makes the job that much harder.

11. THE PROBLEM OF COVER

The first thought was in terms of an archaeological expedition. This particular cover is not the most practical, for several reasons: (a) During the last interbellum period almost all German, English, and other European archaeologists were agents, and all American archaeologists working in the Middle East were suspected and subjected to restrictions. No foreigner could believe that the American scholars were there for scholarly work alone. (b) No archaeological expedition could legitimately be sent out until after the end of the war, and any which started sooner would be doubly suspect. (c) The only existing means of transport to that area are government controlled, and the government would never grant it to a legitimate expedition. (d) As previously stated, the presence of St. John Philby in Arabia, would effectively hinder or bring disaster upon any American expedition in that region. Elsewhere archaeology will be also suspect and men who use that cover must take extreme care in communicating with their sub-agents.

After the war, we must use every kind of mission that sends Americans to the Moslem countries as cover. We must penetrate

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every expedition, every business concern, every government department that brings men into possible contact with Moslems.

But we must also send out genuine Moslems trained by us, for otherwise we cannot hope to do a complete job of penetration. The primary channels will be religious brotherhoods and the pilgrimage. One important channel which may be closed to us as cover is that of the oil companies. I had a long conversation on this subject with Linn Farish shortly before his death, in which he stated that he wouldn't be able to return to his oil company for having worked for OSS. He stated that the oil companies have their own intelligence service, that they would not accept a Government Intelligence Agent, and that their C.E. is so excellent that none could be infiltrated.

12. PERSONNEL

Americans have by far fewer trained Moslem experts capable of this work than the British have, but we have a working nucleus. We have in the OSS a small number of persons who speak some kind of Arabic to some degree; who have lived among Moslems and like them; whom Moslems almost always like and trust; who are full-blooded old time 100% Americans and who have no personal reasons for any loyalty to any other nation. Besides myself, these include Walter Cline, Gordon Browne, Joe Skinner, Dan Dennett, Chuck Shrewsbury, Harold Gladden, James Gaul, and Ann Fuller. These people could be counted on to form a nucleus for any such work. Besides these people, we have in America very large Syrian and Lebanese colonies of native Arabic speakers, most of whom are unreliable for our purposes, but from whose ranks a few trustworthy individuals can be culled. Such men as Gabriel Ayash and George Farah of the CIC, to give but two examples, have been of outstanding use to the American Army in North Africa already, and can be used with complete confidence. From this Syro-Lebanese group we could probably recruit perhaps as many as a hundred useful men.

In our colleges students are becoming more and more interested in the Moslem studies. This is true notably at Harvard, Columbia, Princeton, and the University of Pennsylvania. From the annual crop of graduates and graduate students, American recruits can be made, but only after the war, and only in a long range program.

13. TRAINING

A thorough training in Moslem languages, culture, and attitudes is needed for all members of this branch. This can only be done through the Universities; Harvard, University of Pennsylvania, Columbia, and Princeton in the United States. Supplementary training would be given by special OSS instructors under cover in the neighborhood of these centres, particularly Cambridge, where most of the personnel named above are centered.

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14. A CONCRETE PROPOSAL


I propose, therefore, in view of all the evidence at my disposal, that if we want useful intelligence from Moslem countries, and from Arabia in particular, an archaeological expedition to Saudi Arabia is inadequate; (a) that we must consider the Moslem world as a unit and set up a special branch to deal with it, (b) that this branch must be small in personnel, detached from the Washington offices of the OSS, and run completely under cover.

I believe that if this were done, we should be able to supply the American Government with vitally important information. This same organization could be used for other purposes familiar to those trained in our organization.

Under these circumstances, including the fact that I am well known to Portman Thomas, Philby and others--it might be more useful for me to return to Harvard on completion of my present duties, and get this thing moving under academic cover, than inexplicably to leave the best job in Anthropology in the United States to do field work that I would normally delegate to a graduate student.

A beginning could be made almost at once if we could call a meeting of our Moslem nucleus and offer you a concrete program for the immediate future while laying plans for a long range program.

15. I believe that Dr. Joseph Skinner of X-2 may be leaving shortly for the Near East. He is eminently qualified to work in the Arabian Peninsula, and has already seen Col. Eddy. For reasons of X-2 security, I know little about this but I am sure that if so instructed, he can fill the gap in the intelligence in this area until a specific organization has been created.



CATTLETON S. COON
MAJOR, AUS

Note: Certain sections of this memorandum were prepared in collaboration with Captain Gordon Browne and Dr. Joseph Skinner.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
630 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK 20, N.Y.


14.9.44
Intelligence
X Resubmission
X Summing

5 October 1944

To Brigadier General William J Donovan
From Allen W Dulles

I mentioned to Charlie Cheston today the attached article in the Reader's Digest with regard to Peenemünde.

Of course, the question of credit is of secondary importance but in connection with the history of what OSS has produced, it might be useful to get together our records on the Peenemünde matter as from what the British themselves have told me it appears that the first reports of Peenemünde came from Switzerland some two months before July, 1943.

AWD


NOT TO BE ACCESSIONED



Forty Minutes That Changed the War

Now it can be revealed how one decisive RAF raid held off the production of German robot bombs

Condensed from Saturday Night

Allan A. Michie

IN THE late evening of August 17, 1943, a fleet of 600 RAF heavy night bombers roared out across the North Sea. The next day, the British Air Ministry's communiqué recorded that the research and development station at Peenemünde, Germany, had been attacked.

Behind the deliberately vague language of that communiqué lies one of the most dramatic stories of the war. Unknown to all except a handful of men, the RAF's bomber command had won an aerial battle which was a turning point of the war. It remained a secret, however, for almost a year, until the first robot bombs began to crash on London.

By the spring of 1943, the Allied air offensive had opened gaping wounds across the face of Germany and, to beat back our bombers, the Nazis decided to concentrate on the production of fighter planes.

Soon, with its bomber force reduced to a few hundred obsolete machines, the Luftwaffe was unable to penetrate Britain's defenses except for pinprick hit-and-run attacks. But there remained flying bombs and long-range rockets with which to satisfy the German people's demands for bombing reprisals. If these weapons could be mass-produced in time, they would

enable the Germans to take the offensive in the air without using their precious bombers or airmen.

The decision was taken. Orders went out from Hitler to complete quickly the experimental development of the flying bombs and rockets and to rush them into production.

The main development center for these weapons was the Luftwaffe research station at Peenemünde, craftily tucked away in a forest behind the beach of the Baltic Sea, 60 miles northeast of Siettin and 700 miles from England. Electrified barbed wire kept away all snoopers.

Into Peenemünde went the best technical brains of the Luftwaffe and the top men in German aeronautical and engineering science. In charge was the veteran Luftwaffe scientist, 49-year-old Major General Wolfgang von Chamier-Glisezenski. Under him was a staff of several thousand professors, engineers, and experts on jet-propulsion and rocket projectiles. These scientists were set to working around the clock, for Hitler hoped to unleash his "secret weapons" during the winter of 1943-44.

Enthusiasts believed that the secret weapons would decide the war within 24 hours. More realistic Germans hoped that they would at least dis-

95

As the last wave of bombers flew
homeward, the German night fighters
which had been waiting in vain
around Berlin caught up with them.

... ..

and 41 British bombers were lost — a small price to pay for one of the war's greatest aerial victories.

The next morning a reconnaissance Spitfire photographed the damage. Half of the 45 huts in which scientists and specialists lived had been obliterated, and the remainder were badly damaged. In addition, 40 buildings, including assembly shops and laboratories, had been completely destroyed and 50 others damaged.

In a few days news of even more satisfactory results began to trickle in. Of the 7000 scientists and technical men stationed in Peenemünde, some 5000 were killed or missing. For, at the end of the raid, RAF blockbusters combined with German explosives stored underground had set off such a tremendous blast that people living three miles away were killed.

Head scientist von Chamier-Glizeski died during the raid. Reports drifted out from Germany that he had been shot by agents or jealous Gestapo officials. Two days after the attack, the Germans announced the death of General Jeschonnek, the Luftwaffe's chief of staff and a young Hitler favorite, who had been visiting Peenemünde. Then the Nazis admitted that General Ernst Udet, veteran aviator of the first World War and early organizer of the Luftwaffe, had met death under mysterious circumstances. It seemed likely that Udet, as head of the technical directorate of the German Air Ministry, had also been in Peenemünde.

Nazi reaction to the raid was violent. Gestapo men quizzed survivors and combed the countryside for traitors who might have tipped off the RAF to Peenemünde's impor-

tance. General Walther Schreckback, of the black-shirted secret service, was given command of Peenemünde, with orders to resume work on the flying bombs and rockets.

But all Germany's plans had to be recast. With Peenemünde half destroyed and open to further attack, new laboratories had to be built deep underground. (According to Swedish reports, these have been constructed on islands in the Baltic.) With the best scientists and specialists wiped out, new men had to be found to carry on the developmental work.

As a result of the delay, the Nazis were unable to launch their secret weapons last winter; and they had a difficult time nursing German morale through continued Allied air raids.

The Germans were further set back by Allied air attacks during the spring on flying bomb and rocket launching ramps in Pas de Calais, and on component parts factories. So the people were told that the secret weapons were intended as anti-invasion weapons, being saved to blast the Allies in the ports and on the beaches. D Day, however, caught the Germans still not ready. Not until seven days after the Allies invaded Normandy did the first flying bomb fall on London.

If Peenemünde hadn't been blasted as and when it was, the robot-bomb attacks on London doubtless would have begun six months before they did, and would have been many times as heavy. London communications, the hub of Britain and nerve center of invasion planning and preparation, would have been severely stricken. The invasion itself might have had to be postponed.

SECRET**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.**

14-937
Handwritten signature
W. C. Sullivan
B. H. ...

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM**1 August 1944**

To General Dorn
 7/30/44
 Chief, S.I. *W*

FROM: William P. Maddox, Lt. Col., AUS**SUBJECT: Bombing of Peenemunde**

In compliance with your request arising out of a letter from Major Seafie dated 20 July 1944, the following report is submitted in regard to S.I. intelligence on Peenemunde, and its reception by British SIS.

Late in July or early August 1943 a cable was received from 110 in Switzerland indicating that he had established contact with SIS and was proposing to dispatch certain items of intelligence received from this source. One particular item described the operations of an extensive laboratory at Peenemunde in northern Germany which was said to be engaged in experimentation on secret weapons. Shortly after the receipt of this report, I visited Colonel Sir Claude Dansey at Broadway and discussed the matter with him. With his customary disdain for the activities of 110, Colonel Dansey expressed misgivings in regard to the contact with SIS with whom he claimed to have had dealings in years past.

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-2-

According to Colonel Dansey, 512 could not be trusted and was more than likely engaged in planting Nazi hoaxes upon the unsuspecting 110. He did not believe that the report on Peenemunde was to be given much credence. However, it had been sent to the Air Ministry. About ten days or two weeks later the RAF carried out its first important raid on Peenemunde. As was learned later, reports from various sources as well as from 110 had been received during the previous few months in regard to the secret laboratories.

Although 110 and 512 were not solely responsible for this intelligence, their report was undoubtedly of value in verifying other reports. On subsequent occasions we took pleasure in chiding Colonel Dansey on his initial apprehensions about the activities of 110 and 512.


W. F. M.**SECRET**

Form 57 (Rev. 10-1-44)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE October 4, 1944

FROM VICTOR, HONGKONG

TO OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

DISTRIBUTION

IN 21893

(FOR ACTION)

(FOR INFORMATION)

DIRECTOR

SECRETARIAT, SI

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER **SECRET**

#2357. 154, 109 and Doering from Halliwell.

Dacey has compared the 3 priority messages from Hall, which were forwarded through him by the latter, with the messages received each day from the 14th Air Force under Chennault's signature. He has found that the material contained in the Hall cables is practically the same as the information set forth in the Chennault cables which reached us by operational priority a day ahead of the cables from Hall. It is our conclusion, therefore, that the material in Hall's messages is in fact the official release from the Army, or else it is being employed for this purpose by the 14th Air Force.

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TR: 10/4/44 11:01 PM

EXE COPY

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO COPY OR REPRODUCE THIS CABLE
WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRETARIAT

Cole Karty —

The General asked
me to write this
for him. You may
want to comment on
the first two points
and fill in the
numbers in TP 1.
Point # 3 is the one
with which I am chiefly
concerned. Will you
give him the memo (2) and

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
2677TH REGIMENT
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES (PROVISIONAL)
APO 554, U.S. ARMY

14746 B
Intelligence
X Permanent
X Dodd E/t
X Middle East

8 August 1944

MEMORANDUM TO: General Donovan

FROM : E. H. Dodd

As you requested, I am setting down in a memorandum the matters we discussed this morning in the courtyard at Caserta.

1. SERVICES: Now that demands on OSS at the fighting fronts are suddenly mushrooming, there is danger that servicing and communications may hamper us in reaping a full harvest of our efforts. Probably as much as is possible has recently been done for Communications. Services, however, needs more manpower and talent.

a. Major Lockwood says he should have 25 additional slots (with several high grades) immediately.

b. As you suggested, a program for recruiting civilian personnel in the theater should be worked out.

c. More transportation is essential. So many efforts have already been made that only very high echelon is now worth trying. Perhaps you will want to take this up personally with General Devers. We need _____ jeeps, _____ staff cars, _____ trucks.

2. CENTRAL EUROPEAN SECTION: Organization is well in hand, but provision should be made to feed in regularly operational intelligence from Bari, London, Istanbul. There is a hint that London has been selected as the forward coordinating base, but even so we will barely skim the potentialities of Chapin's setup unless he can know what is going on elsewhere.

3. PERMANENT INTELLIGENCE: Work can and should be started immediately on organizing a permanent network in the Middle East. Cairo seems an ideal testing ground and base to pioneer the effort. Algiers could be tied in on a basis commensurate with its future significance. The lads now at Cairo know what should be done and how to do it. They await the necessary appointments and orders from you to go ahead. Penrose was suggested to head the field effort; Lewis Leary to be sent back to Washington to start the recruiting and training of agents. I would suggest further that you select a top notch man attached to your own office in Washington who can (1) drive the effort on an administrative level; (2) coordinate the aims of the different branches involved; (3) draw up

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plans and define the problems of sounding out the White House and Congress, and for exploring the possibilities of a future hook-up with State or JCS. Washington must of course initiate this program, but it cannot do so intelligently without close contact with the field, preferably over a period of time. We must capitalize to the full on the momentum and experience we now have and on our training facilities. The framing of the actual structure for the future should be started now, and men now in the field should be instructed to give part of their time to this work. If the end of hostilities catches us without a carefully built (and, if possible, approved) plan, we may find it exceedingly difficult to persuade good men to sit around while such a plan is formulated. Moreover the loss of present working contacts and of opportunities for testing in the field would be irretrievable.

Robt. J.

SECRET

Colonel Doering

For comment.

WJD

Director's Office

(3306)

Date 14 Nov.

COMMANDER T. E. McBAINE

Could you please tell me
if you know anything of the
status of the attached, and
could I have your personal
comments on the subject.

G. C. E. Jr.

SECRET

Office of the Executive Officer

(30489)

G-002-803

Office of Strategic Services
US Army Forces in the Middle East

3 August 1944

COPY

Mr. Whitney H. Shepardson
Office of Strategic Services
Washington, D. C.

Dear Whitney:

Attached hereto you will find an answer to your cable 37404, which was not entirely clear to us as we did not understand whether you wanted purely a future plan for SI or for the whole of Cairo. Steve Penrose took it as all-inclusive and spent considerable time drawing up the enclosed. As a matter of fact, I did not know he was doing it or I might have suggested some revisions. I have held this on my desk for about 10 days trying to correct it in certain spots, but I think you might as well have it in its original form.

In general it is very well done although I think we can give you a clearer picture of the whole installation, including personnel, etc., at a later date. I don't think you will find any glaring inaccuracies, and I assure you that it took Steve a long time to do this. You will hear from us later on the same subject.

Sincerely,

(Signed John)

J. E. Toulmin
Col., A.G.D.
Strategic Services Officer, M.E.

Note: Just leaving for Bari and in the cleanup just wasn't energy enough left in my body to really check this plan in detail. (Signed J)

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COPY

G-002-724

Letter No. 24

July 22, 1944

Refer to: 100/23

Subject: Future Plans for Cairo Intelligence Headquarters.
To: Mr. Whitney Shepardson

1. In response to cable No. 37404, requesting specific recommendations regarding future intelligence headquarters in Cairo, the attached plan has been prepared. In accordance with the request, it is divided into two parts dealing with (a) the situation after Greece has been evacuated by the Germans and (b) during the postwar period.

2. There are naturally a great many factors which cannot be anticipated at the moment which will affect the implementation of these plans. Care has been taken to state the assumptions upon which the plans are based.

3. Two copies of the plan are enclosed, one for yourself and one for General Donovan if you consider it worth passing on to him.

4. The personnel figures given are approximate, inasmuch as some shifting from branch to branch on the basis of present assignments is anticipated. The estimates given will probably not conform exactly to the Washington T/O, but they represent in general the personnel situation as it at present exists.

5. It should be noted that in both plans herein described, the personnel figures given are for the Cairo office only. Field personnel outside Cairo are not enumerated.

At present, Cairo personnel makes up about 60% of the total Middle East complement. In the post evacuation period it will run to 70 or 75% of the revised total figures.

For the Strategic Services Officer:

(Signed Steve)
Stephen B. L. Penrose, Jr.
Chief, SI

Attachments

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED~~ ~~EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION~~

A. Situation at Headquarters after the evacuation of Greece.

1. General Administration.

For the administration of the Cairo Office it will be necessary to maintain a Chief of Mission who is a field grade officer, to whom the US/EE remains responsible to USARPAC. The Chief of Mission will also have the function of liaison officer with the military and the Chief Intelligence Officer arbitrating any questions which may arise between intelligence branches.

Personnel requirements will be two officers and one secretary. The administrative setup of the separate branches is at present, limited to a minimum. The number of personnel involved will remain as it is. For example, FI-3, including the Chief, the executive assistant, and one secretary.

2. Special MI.

It is to be assumed that these two branches will cease functioning in Cairo after the reoccupation of Greece. Presumably, SO operations will no longer be required unless the opportunity for them develops in Romania and Bulgaria and the handling of those operations must be done in Cairo. SO operations will likewise presumably be concerned only with occupied territories and the functions of the Branch in Cairo should be transferred to a base nearer the fighting front.

The present complement for SO is two officers and one enlisted man (clerk typist). For MO, the complement is ten officers and civilians, six enlisted men, and one civilian secretary.

3. Liaison Branch.

The protection of field missions and the maintenance of counter-intelligence and counter-subversive activities will continue to be important in the Middle East even after the withdrawal of the Germans from Greece. It is to be assumed that they will leave behind them a considerable number of agents, against whom our operations will require intense work. The Liaison Branch will, therefore, continue to function with no decrease in staff.

The present complement includes one officer, one enlisted man, and three civilian secretaries and typists.

4. Liaison Branch.

Cairo offers an excellent neutral location at the main com-

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the action center where the functions of the section are likely to be carried out. Cairo will continue to receive intelligence reports from Iraq and the Middle East, as well as from Turkey, so that there will be no occasion for the functions of the section to discontinue in its entirety, at least in the immediate future.

The present complement is five officers of civilians and eight enlisted men (including one secretary and one clerk-typist).

5. MC.

So long as the operations of the Greek Section must be carried by sea, the Maritime Unit must continue in operation. As soon, however, as regular transport lines are established to Greece from the island, it should be possible to disperse with our own marine force. Under such circumstances the Maritime Unit can probably be transferred elsewhere, with the exception of a Maritime Liaison Officer to handle relations with the British maritime services.

The present complement is three officers and one enlisted (clerk-typist).

Security Office.

The functions of the Security Office will be considerably reduced, inasmuch as active recruiting in Cairo will be largely abandoned. A Security Officer and an office staff sufficient to handle the clearance and liaison with Army security officers will be required. The functions of the Registry must be continued undiminished.

The required complement will be two officers, three enlisted men and two secretaries.

Finance Office.

The Finance Office can hardly be expected to reduce its complement, although the small decrease in personnel which is envisaged will be of a lot of consideration.

The present complement is one civilian in charge, four civilian bookkeeper-typists.

Civilian Section.

German Section.

Present intentions envisage the movement of the Greek Section to Athens as soon as the withdrawal of the Germans makes it possible. It will be essential, however, that the Section

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be represented in Cairo by personnel who can process reports for local dissemination and handle the provision of supplies and equipment which may be necessary from Cairo.

It is assumed at present that the total personnel required for the Greek Section in Cairo will be two officers and one secretary.

b. Near East Section.

The Near East Section will continue functioning practically at present, with no diminution in its activities for a considerable period of time. It will continue to require its present personnel of two officers or civilians and two secretaries and typists.

c. Labor Section.

The Labor Section, if it continues to exist, will require a complement of one officer and one secretary. It would be the recommendation of the Chief, SI that the Labor Desk be eliminated shortly after the move forward into Greece, inasmuch as labor activity in the theater is exceedingly limited.

d. Turkish Section.

On the assumption that Istanbul will remain a functioning base, though its activities may be somewhat curtailed, it will be desirable to maintain a Turkish liaison officer, with one assistant, in Cairo.

e. Reports Office.

It is probable the Reports Office will have to be maintained at present strength. Because of the need for local dissemination of intelligence reports passing through Cairo from the Greek and Near East theaters will require processing and reproduction, at least until the major theaters for such intelligence have ceased to function.

The present complement (including Central Files personnel) is composed of two officers, eight civilian or enlisted typists and one stenographer.

f. Training School.

The SI Training School will be eliminated before or shortly after the advance of the Greek Section. At the present time it is used for the training of Greek personnel and whatever training will be done in the future will be handled in Greece.

The present complement is four officers (instructors) and

SECRET

eighteen enlisted men (five instructors and thirteen station comple-

1. Africa Section.

It will be at least necessary to maintain the present liaison for the Africa Section in Cairo and it would be highly desirable to expand this section in order to provide direct development of field contacts in Ethiopia, Eritrea, and the Somali. Cairo will for a considerable period continue to possess the largest potential work for intelligence from these areas and all possible steps should be taken to improve the efficiency of our services to them.

The complement should be one officer and one secretary, with the possible addition of another officer to bring the total to three.

2. Total Complement Required for SI.

The estimated total requirements for SI, including the Chief of the Branch, his executive assistant, and his secretary, would be fifty officers and civilians and fifteen enlisted or civilian sergeants, typists, and clerks.

3. Communications Branch.

For a considerable period of time after the move of the SI Section to Athens has taken place, no decrease in the number of field circuits with SI missions will be anticipated. Arrangements will be necessary for maintaining radio contact under one of two possible situations: (a) With a base station in Athens. (b) With the base station remaining in Cairo, from which field messages will be relayed to Athens on a single open circuit.

In situation (a) a communications complement of ten men and supervisors will be required in Cairo; and in situation (b) a complement of seventeen men and two supervisors will be required. In either case, the total number of Communications personnel in the Middle East will remain the same, although seven of them will be in Athens. Additional personnel to man the Athens station are expected to be made available from the present Training School complement. It is expected that although no new Communications personnel will be required, those presently in Cairo will be used to the limit.

Message Center: The complement of the Message Center will be determined by the same conditions as relate to the radio station. In situation (a), if Athens is a Communications center, the Message Center in Cairo will need eight men and the Message Center in Athens will need eight men. Under situation (b), with Cairo maintaining the base personnel, a total complement of sixteen men will be needed in Cairo.

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10. Services Branch

In the Services Branch, the removal of the Training School will eliminate a number of personnel who are now assigned as guards, cooks, and other station complement. Aside from this reduction, it appears probable that Services cannot be seriously reduced so long as the MU, X-2, and SI continue to function. Furthermore, any personnel who would be freed by the closing of the Training School would be needed for the Athens base, together with those of the enlisted men now handling transport.

It seems probable that the II Greek Section will have to be provided with transportation by (SS, MU, etc.) as it is unlikely that USAFME will allow us any individual vehicles. OSS/AL is not too well supplied at the present time with transportation and will be hard put to it to make both ends meet.

The present Services complement is approximately forty enlisted men.

11. The total number of personnel for the Cairo Office, present and future, broken down for the various branches, is as follows (estimated and approximate only):

Branch	Present Complement	Required Complement
Administration	4	3
SG	3	0
MO	17	0
X-2	5	5
School of Trainings	22	0
MHA	13	13
MU	4	2
Security	11	7
Finance	5	5
SI	63	30
Communications	61	32 (case 2, para. 9)
Services	43	39
Total	262	132

12. The situation described above is predicated on several assumptions: (a) That our present fruitful liaison with the

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2. Signature of the Head of the Agency _____

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Area to be Controlled.

1. Background Operations at Cairo.

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or necessary. The Cairo Office will be the main servicing and control office for all advance bases in the Middle East, at the same time being their major liaison with Washington. It will maintain agents, services and evaluation records, prepare directives for field intelligence operations, maintain an intelligence file containing duplicates of all Middle East agent reports, check out transient agents with current briefing, maintain a stockpile of specialized OSS supplies and equipment to service advance bases, etc., etc. It will not, except in special cases, communicate with field agents direct, this function belonging exclusively to the advance bases. The Cairo Headquarters will transmit to advance bases directives from Washington, for the interpretation and activation of which it will be held responsible by Washington. Cairo will also be the determiner of field policy in the first instance, subject to guidance from Washington.

d. Administrative Functions.

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e. Communications.

Cairo will maintain cipher communications with Washington and with all Middle East advance bases such as Athens, Sofia, London, Istanbul, Ankara, Beirut or Damascus, Jerusalem, Baghdad, Teheran, Jidda. Presumably State Department cover will be used for cables, which will be in OSS cipher, and the diplomatic pouch will carry written matter.

f. Training.

Cairo Headquarters should possibly be prepared to train agents recruited by the various advance bases. Experience alone will show whether or not this is necessary, and no personnel for it is included in the present plan.

2. Personnel.

At the Cairo Headquarters there should be a Chief of Intelligence for the Middle East, together with a Deputy who will alternate with him in travel about the field and in maintaining essential contact with Washington. In addition to this administrative pair, there should be an expert on the Arab World and a Balkan expert, to procure and assist in the control of intelligence channels into Cairo from the various sub-bases. An administrative officer and an assistant, with responsibility for finance, supply, local security, servicing of field missions, securing of visas, passports, travel, etc., will be required. The Cairo Headquarters will need two cipher clerks to handle coding and decoding of OSS messages, which should be independent of State Department codes

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are, though State communication is not the best. It is possible that a liaison is possible between bases, a good liaison staff will be required for the coordination of bases.

Very little discrimination of intelligence will be required in the field, and consequently the program and personnel basis for the field should be maintained at a low operational level. With a minimum of more than six specially qualified personnel being required. The total complement of intelligence field workers would be a minimum, exclusive of communications personnel.

Qualification of Personnel

1. The Chief, SI.

He should be a man with considerable administrative ability, thorough SI training and experience, a wide general knowledge of the Balkans and the Middle East. He should be capable of inspiring the loyalty of representatives working under him, both in administrative positions among field bases and the actual field agents whom he may have occasion to meet. With the stimulation of the program moved, it will be infinitely more difficult to maintain the standards among field personnel, and to do so will be a major function of the Chief, SI. He will have to travel rather constantly, to the program of covering the advance bases, and he should be in Washington for at least a brief period not less than once a month. He should also be capable of establishing sound personal contacts with local and foreign civil and governmental representatives in Egypt.

2. Deputy Chief, SI.

The Deputy Chief must have in large measure the same qualities as described for the Chief. He will have to maintain the program of Cairo Headquarters during the absence of the Chief and will have to alternate for him in his personal contacts with local and field personnel.

3. Middle East Expert.

The expert on the Arab World should be able to analyze and interpret intelligence reports channeled to him from advance bases in the Arab World, including Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. Experience has shown that reports frequently suffer from lack of perspective, and the expert in Cairo should be in a position to provide it. He should be in direct contact of the advance bases of his area at least once a month and should be responsible for providing specific information to which intelligence is sought.

SECRET

d. The Field Agent

The same qualifications as those required for the Chief of Station will apply to the Field Agent for all posts.

e. The Administrative Officer

This man should be thoroughly familiar with the financial and domestic procedure relative to foreign countries. He should be able to establish friendly relations with consular officials and officials of the various countries with representation in the post. He will need experience in the handling of business affairs, including the maintenance of financial records. He should also be an expert in transportation in the various countries of the Middle East. He will be responsible for the maintenance of the post's supplies and equipment.

f. The Assistant Administrative Officer

He should be a trained security officer and will be primarily responsible for vetting new field personnel, maintaining internal security in Cairo and supervising security measures at the base. In addition, he should be qualified to assist and substitute for the Administrative Officer in the performance of his functions.

g. Secretarial Personnel

Thoroughly capable, experienced personnel will be required. The secretaries of the Chief, Deputy Chief, and the two geographic areas should be familiar with SI work, capable of classifying and coding intelligence and maintaining a registry as well as performing routine secretarial functions. The secretary of the Administrative Officer should be trained in OSS financial procedures, maintaining records of vouchered and unvouchered funds. The secretary of the Assistant Administrative Officer should be able to assist in such matters. In addition should be trained in security procedures and handling security records. The two cipher clerks should be polygraphs as well as typists, capable of doing finished work with intelligence reports. All personnel must be thoroughly checked for security and trained in security practice.

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IN SILENCE, THE REPORTEDLY IN THE PAST
THEIR DESIGNS, THE PERSONNEL FIGURES OF THE
IN CAIRO OFFICE ONLY. THESE FIGURES COULD BE
CAIRO ARE NOT ESTIMATED.

AT PRESENT, CAIRO PERSONNEL VARIOUSLY ABOUT
FOR THE TOTAL, WHICH IS NOT COMPLETED. IN THE POST
THE RATIO PERIOD OF WILL RUN 10:70 OR 75% OF THE
REVISED TOTAL FIGURES.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DATE JULY 11, 1944

TODD: 7/11/44 8:12 PM

OUT: 1800

FROM OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

TO GUSTAV, CAIRO

(SECRET)

CONFIRMATION: IN

INFORMATION: DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, MAJOR GEN, SCR 3121, PHOTO, E-2.

CONFIRMATION

SECRET

137404, 754 TO PENROSE.

100 WOULD LIKE YOUR SPEEDY SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATION ABOUT FUTURE
 INTELLIGENCE HQ IN CAIRO (A) SUBSEQUENT TO THE EVACUATION OF GREECE BY
 THE NAZIS; (B) SUBSEQUENT TO THE END OF THE WAR.

✓

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TODD: 7/11/44 8:130 PM

HA 1148 PM.

137404.

Intelligence 14.5.61
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This paper prepared by the Director of Naval Intelligence, Melbourne.

1. Coast-watching in the Islands has been possible only through the intimate personal relationship existing between Coast-watchers and the organisers and controllers, Feldt, and to a lesser extent Mackenzie.

2. Feldt concentrated on the New Guinea-New Britain scene.

3. Laird said that he gave the idea in April 1942 to MacArthur; sketched out a scheme for an Allied Intelligence Bureau and helped to develop and support it. The reasons were the imperative necessity for centralising demands upon the very limited transport facilities; the small number of first-class agents available; and the obvious benefit to be obtained from one central and powerful group engaged in the perfection and supply of specialised equipment. The American Staff Officers immediately concerned in the control of the A. I. B. were very poor material.

4. First it consisted of four sections:

- a. Coast-watching
- b. SIS
- c. Special Operations
- d. Field Propaganda.

Blamey built it into a very successful organization. Now, it is to be taken back and made into an offshoot of the Allied Intelligence Bureau. They did not know SO work and they did not like London control of SIS.

5. In the Soupac Area, Mackenzie as Deputy Supervising Intelligence Officer was responsible to Feldt and Feldt to DNI. Ghormley and his successor Halsey have insisted upon that arrangement. The D. S. I. O. based at Lunga in the Solomons has always worked for Comsoupleac and not for Comsou-wespac.

6. Feldt became sick on March 20th, 1943, was replaced by Mackenzie who contracted Blackwater Fever, is now at Brisbane and cannot return to the Tropics. Pryce-Jones took Mackenzie's place.

7. Lt. Cmdr McManus, RAN continues to hold the appointment of SIO at Brisbane.

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- 3 -

10. The last GHQ Directive stresses the gaining of intelligence from forward areas. Three intelligence groups, British, Dutch, and American. British to the North-east of Australia; Dutch - the ex-Dutch possessions; and American the Philippines. They made SO and SIS subordinate.

11. Position of Special Operations (known as Services Reconnaissance Department) is improving due to MacArthur's desire to exclude Donovan and OSS.

12. Llaird says McGovern not well received and that McGovern concluded nothing could be done. SO have been allowed by G-2 to be the intelligence group in Portuguese Timor.

13. The work of SIS has been one of preparation pending the result of transport from England.

14. Llaird has attempted to get them to organize forward intelligence work in the Pacific under one Supreme Intelligence head who would be responsible to Washington. They were asked to provide technical talent to produce specialized communication and other equipment necessary for the various techniques which must be employed in the Pacific. No attempt has been made to work ground agents in the Marshalls, Carolines, and similar Pacific Island groups. Reliance is being placed entirely upon Signal Intelligence and air reconnaissance. This is unwise and may lead to the loss of many lives and in some possible cases to disaster.

15. Captain A. H. McCollum, USN commanding the 7th Fleet Staff tried to put this through for eighteen months.

16. There are only now four true Coast-watching parties in the Solomons. Others have been lent to Amphibious Forces as nuclei of reconnaissance parties before the landings. At Empress Augusta Bay in Bougainville, two such parties reconnoitered that terrain over a period of a week or ten days.

17. Part two of Feldt's report shows how work was taken over on the mainland of New Guinea by New Guinea Force and the off-shoot the Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit and why coast watching technique no longer suitable for that area.

18. There are still numbers of true Coast-Watching parties in New Britain and New Ireland and they will be required to work in the Bismark Archipelago.

19. The Dutch have not been particularly successful in their area, due to the lack of suitable agents and to their inability to obtain submarine transport and due to internal dissention.

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- 3 -

20. The area to the South of the Mountain range is under the control of the First Australian Army, based on Morauke, who, in connection with the Dutch, are sending parties out as far as Ellanden River.

21. They have based their submarines in Western Australia. Their bands control the Philippines except at the three principal Jap bases -- Davao, Cebu, and Cavite. The principal shipping channels in the islands are covered by Coast-watching groups who communicate with American stations at Darwin and Fremantle. Captain McCollum dissatisfied and has prevailed upon the Army to take over their Coast-watching work. He is installing much more powerful radio sets and is sending up trained officers and men to insure that no operational intelligence will be missed.

22. NID - Its position in Operational Area.

The area to the Northeast of Australia -- organization by no means static

24. Operational areas have been stocked with the best personnel available and this has paid dividends. American units have tended to accept NID personnel on their ability as individuals.

25. British growing steadily weaker in numbers. McCollum not yet advised them whether he'll let them tie in more closely.

26. A list of intelligence personnel is being prepared to send into the South East Asia Command.

27. Intended to keep liaison officers in New Hebrides and the Solomons and all other captured areas.

28. Wastage of manpower terrific.

29. NID Coast watching.

30. Present efforts made by Sir Philip Mitchell, High Commissioner, Western Pacific to restock his very depleted Administration Staff and regain immediately ex Administration personnel from Coast-Watching to be supported.

31. British administration in the Pacific will have a hard row to hoe.

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To: ~~Central~~


There was no time to proof-
read this. Sorry.

Director's Office

10081

7
To: Lt. Tarrant: 5/18/44

The Dissemination Committee has
been informed and retained a copy.



John Magruder, Brig. Gen.
Deputy Director, OSS — Intelligence Service
(0655)

General Magruder

Lieutenant Putzell has asked that the attached communication concerning disclosure of intelligence information to the Russians be sent you for your information. Will you please return it for our files.

Warren J. Tarrant
Warren J. Tarrant
2d Lt, AGD

Director's Office

10 May 1944
(3300)

CONFIDENTIAL

28 April 1944

CONFIDENTIAL

L. F. Glavin

Intelligence to the Russians

The directive relating to on to the Russians. This

dated Dec. 22, 1943 and 2274.

Edward J. Glavin
EDWARD J. F. GLAVIN
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

Copy to Mr. Shepardson

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
2877TH HEADQUARTERS COMPANY, OSS (PROVISIONAL)
APO 518, U. S. ARMY

28 April 1944 **CONFIDENTIAL**
28 April 1944

MEMORANDUM

To: Director, OSS
From: Colonel Edward J. F. Glavin
Subject: Dissemination of Intelligence to the Russians

Herewith official AHC directive relating to the dissemination of information to the Russians. This is in partial answer to your cables Nos. 3333 and 3374.

Edward J. F. Glavin
EDWARD J. F. GLAVIN
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

Copy to Mr. Sheperdson

1944
CONFIDENTIAL
HOS

ALLIED FORCE IN AMERICA
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
APO 512, U. S. ARMY

GBZ/198

24 April 1944

MEMORANDUM TO:

Director, OSS
Albany

SUBJECT :

Information for the Russians.

No information will be passed to the Russians other than by the War Department, Washington, the G-3 Office London or the Allied Military Mission in Moscow. Certain enemy order of battle intelligence concerning this theatre may from time to time be passed to them by the A.C. of S., G-3 or his deputy as a matter of courtesy and in this case Washington and London will be informed of the details of the information passed.

You are therefore directed not to give any information to the Russians and should you be approached by them to refer the questions to this H.Q.

S/T. E. RODRIGUEZ
Brigadier General, G.S.C.
D/A.C. of S., G-3.

CONFIDENTIAL

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NOT FOR P. 12 11 44

RECEIVED

